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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays investigating renegotiation of pro-
curement auctions in the road construction industry. The empirical analysis uses
contracts procured by the Vermont Agency of Transportation from 2004 to 2009.
In practice, these adjustments, frequently attributed to incomplete contracts, are
observed in sizable and complex procurement projects. As a consequence there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between contract amounts and ﬁnal payments to a contractor
due to ex post changes. In addition, it is possible that ﬁrm’s bidding strategies are
inﬂuenced by the anticipation of change orders, with negative eﬀects on the eﬃ-
ciency and overall cost of highway construction programs. First we investigate the
impacts of ex post renegotiations on ex ante bidders’ bidding behaviors and their
markups and costs. In particular, we consider a set of adjustment types such as
quantity adjustments and extra work adjustments which are common in the ﬁeld.
Then we analyze the factors associated with the frequency of change orders.
In the ﬁrst essay, we focus on ex ante bidder’s strategic bidding behavior in an-
ticipation of ex post contract renegotiation. The empirical analysis shows that the
magnitude of estimated markups is systematically higher for projects with positive
quantity adjustments than those without such renegotiations. The second essay
continues the study of the impact of incomplete contracts that requires ex post ex-
tra work on procurement costs. We ﬁnd this unique compensation process causes
signiﬁcant adaptation costs at the renegotiation stage, which provides contractors
ix
with markups similar to those they would earn in projects without renegotiations
at all. In the last essay, we investigate the reasons for the frequency and mag-
nitude of renegotiations in the Vermont transportation contracts. We show that
project uncertainty and complexity and bidding behaviors are valuable predictors
of renegotiations.
All these studies are about public procurement in the transportation industry.
Every essay provides a transportation department with relevant policy implications.
This study has the potential to increase the eﬃciency of budgetary planning for
the transportation department, and reduce costs to the tax payers. Our empirical
analysis shows that bidder’s strategic bidding and adaptation costs associated with
renegotiating a contract could increase the procurement costs. Therefore, it may be
preferable for the procuring agency to invest more time in providing more completed
designs rather than to proceed with the project and deal with renegotiations ex post.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 An Overview
Public procurement accounts for roughly10-15% of GDP for developed countries and
can amount to as mush as 20% of GDP for developing countries (Kashap, 2004).
The public sector spends between $1.4 and $1.6 trillion annually. In particular,
the US federal government alone spent $231.08 billion in 2000 while state and local
governments spent about six times more than the federal government in the pro-
curement process (Thai, 2001). In the state of Vermont, state government spent
about 8% of its total spending in transportation projects.1 Included in this budget
approximately $0.2 billion was spent on road construction alone.
Procurers typically provide descriptions of their unique needs including time
delivery and payment conditions before letting auction and require contractors to
comply the deﬁned speciﬁcations to ﬁt a certain level of quality speciﬁcations and
price estimates. There is however often a discrepancy between the original contract
and the ﬁnal contract speciﬁcations and price estimates due to incomplete designs or
unexpected changes. Such a discrepancy leads to extensive renegotiations between
1Source: usgovermentspending.com
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two parties in the public sector.
Ex post changes to procurement contracts are common and costly for govern-
ments. In empirical reports, Bordat, McCullouch, and Sinha (2004) ﬁnd that cost
overruns are almost 9% of total contract amounts and 12% of all contracts experi-
enced time delays in Indiana between 1995 and 2002. In addition, Oladapo (2007)
reports that the changes in speciﬁcations and scope of a project account for 79%
of the total cost overrun and 68% of the total time overrun in the Nigerian road
construction industry. Oudot (2006) documents that 56% of contracts are renegoti-
ated increasing the cost by 5% to 30% in French defense procurement sector while
Guasch, Laﬀont, and Straub (2008) found that 53% of contracts in the transporta-
tion sector in Latin America were renegotiated and this percentage increases to 76%
in water sector consisting of portable water, sewer and composite water.2 Bourn
(2001) reports that 55% of Public Finance Initiative (PFI) projects have experienced
changes in United Kingdom.
Although renegotiations in public procurement frequently take place and their
impacts on the economy are signiﬁcant, only few empirical studies have been con-
ducted in the literature. The objective of my dissertation is to study the impact
of ex post renegotiations on a bidder’s bidding behavior and markups. The poten-
tial renegotiations will change a bidder’s ex post incentive mechanism and ex ante
bidding strategy, often signiﬁcantly raising the costs of public procurement. For
example, when ﬁrms anticipate that procurement contracts are renegotiated after
they are awarded, they incorporate these expectations into their ex ante bidding
behavior. Renegotiations also create adaptation costs that relate to legal conﬂict
and dispute costs. Therefore, the eﬀect of ex post renegotiation on markups is de-
pendent on the relative magnitude between those two factors. Further, this research
studies the factors associated with the frequency and magnitude of renegotiations.
2They use nearly 307 concession contracts awarded between 1989 and 2000 in Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico).
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Examinations of ex post renegotiation in procurement auction could lead to con-
siderable beneﬁts for the public by providing policy implications that mitigate cost
overruns in road construction industry.
This dissertation consists of three essays that analyze ex post renegotiation in
procurement auctions studying diﬀerent components of renegotiation. In the ﬁrst
essay, we estimate the incidence and magnitude of strategic bidding. When ﬁrms
bid in procurement auctions, they take into account the likelihood of future contract
renegotiations. If they anticipate that certain input quantities will change ex post,
they have an incentive to strategically skew their itemized bids, thereby increasing
proﬁts for themselves and costs for the procuring agency. We develop and estimate
a structural model of strategic bidding using a dataset of road construction projects
in Vermont. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms engage in strategic bidding that increases proﬁt
margins by 3-4% at the project level, and 16-18% on the speciﬁc items that are
renegotiated.
The second essay continues to study the impact of incomplete contracts on pro-
curement costs in road construction auctions. Ex ante contracts in these auctions
often fail to specify all of the potential construction contingencies, and consequently
changes in scope are necessary after construction begins. Unlike quantity adjust-
ments, every bidder typically has symmetric information on extra work adjustments
because of project uncertainty. We ﬁnd evidence that there is a statistically signif-
icant diﬀerence in costs of ﬁrms between auctions with and without extra work
adjustments. Substantial adaptation costs are responsible for the higher procure-
ment outlays in incomplete contracts. We also ﬁnd that bidders inﬂate their bids to
incorporate risk premiums in incomplete contracts; however, our estimates suggest
that this bidding behavior does not aﬀect their proﬁt margins.
In the ﬁnal essay, we examine the factors that contribute to contract renego-
tiation in Vermont through an empirical analysis of change orders. We ﬁnd that
3
ﬁrms’ bidding behavior is capable of predicting change orders. In particular, greater
disagreements in project valuation among bidders, and between the winning bidder
and the state engineers, predicts a greater incidence of change orders. Moreover,
we ﬁnd evidence supporting the hypothesis that “top” ﬁrms, those with signiﬁcant
presence in the market, possess superior information about whether projects are
likely to have change orders, bid accordingly and are more likely to renegotiate con-
tracts. In such concentrated industries, top ﬁrms could use their power to sway
renegotiation outcomes to their favor. However, conditional on submission, there is
very little evidence that top ﬁrms’ change orders are any more costly than those of
other ﬁrms. Finally, we ﬁnd that project characteristics associated with uncertainty
and project complexity, such as size, duration and location are valuable predictors
of contract renegotiations.
1.2 Literature on Procurement Auction with Rene-
gotiation
This section brieﬂy reviews literature on general procurement auctions and renego-
tiations in government contracts in particular.3 In practice, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) favors the use of auction mechanism in the public sector be-
cause of its beneﬁts such as high eﬃciency and low prices. Particularly, the use of
competitive auction mechanism that leads to high competition and transparency is
preferred.4 However, the competitive awarding mechanism would not be eﬃcient
for complex projects with the expectation of ex post adaptations. In procurement
3McAfee and McMillan (1987) (p. 701) deﬁne that “An auction is a market institution with
an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the
market participants.”
4There are four types of award mechanisms: open competitive bidding; invited bidder bidding;
pre-qualiﬁed bidders bidding; negotiations. In general, competitive tendering auction includes the
ﬁrst three types.
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award mechanisms, there is a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency of cost minimization and
ease of adaption of change orders (Bajari and Tadelis, 2006). The competitive bid-
ding mechanism would fail to achieve eﬃciency due to the ex post adaptation costs.
Further, regarding ﬂexibility and renegotiation in the ﬁeld, Chong, Staropoli, and
Yvrande-Billon (2009) show that negotiation may be more eﬃcient as an award
mechanism in procurement when projects are complex or less potential competition
is expected.
In payment structures, a ﬁxed price contract has ex ante incentives on cost
savings and may be less ﬂexible for adopting ex post changes to the scope of work.
Thus, a ﬁxed price contract will be preferred if contracts are initially well speciﬁed
and it is easy to detect the deviations from the original contract. Meanwhile, a
cost plus contract provides ﬂexibility in accommodating unforeseen changes while
contractors have weak cost minimization incentives under a cost plus framework.
In that case, a cost-plus contract is more feasible if ex post substantial changes are
expected and adversarial renegotiation is anticipated in complex projects.5 Bajari
and Tadelis (2001) show that expected ex post adaptation costs are an important
consideration in procurement contract selection. Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis
(2014) estimate the adaptation costs of $2.7 per $1 of expected contract adjustment
in the procurement of highway construction projects in California. They emphasize
that bidders inﬂate their bids to incorporate high risk premiums that result from
the loss occurred from ex post adaptation costs.
Many local state governments provide a detailed project description including
state engineer’s cost estimates which reduce informational asymmetries among bid-
ders (De Silva, Kosmopoulou, and Lamarche, 2009). It includes estimates of quan-
tities and prices of each task in the project. The eﬀect of sharing information on
bidding behavior has been considered since the early theoretical paper by Milgrom
5See Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2009) for more details.
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and Weber (1982), which proves that releasing information causes rational bidders
to shade their bids to oﬀset the winner’s curse in common value auction. Goeree and
Oﬀerman (2002) also show that releasing information helps bidders reduce uncer-
tainty about the value of item and the winner’s curse in their experimental setting.
De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge, and Kosmopoulou (2008) support this theory us-
ing data from road construction in Oklahoma and Texas. Furthermore, De Silva,
Kosmopoulou, and Lamarche (2009) ﬁnd that the release information will help new
entrants survive longer in the construction market.
Contract theory underlines the importance of completely specifying a contract
so that there is no strategic manipulation of bids in light of potential renegotia-
tions. In practice, however, ﬁrms are more likely to strategically read the plans
and speciﬁcations, and thereby they manipulate their bids in anticipation of ex post
renegotiations. The plans and speciﬁcations described on the original contract may
be altered in the ﬁeld as a complex project often consists of a higher number of
tasks. In reality, it is hard for the engineers to provide the complete design and
speciﬁcation for every construction contingency in the design stage. Firms know
that the procurer cannot renegotiate the price of a task in a contract due to the
FAR guidelines unless a completely new task is added to the contract in the ﬁeld.
As in Athey and Levin (2001), ﬁrms are able to increase their expected proﬁts by
submitting high unit prices on items that they expect to overrun in the future and
by submitting lower unit prices on items whose actual quantity used is lower.
Contract theory predicts that there is no need to be renegotiated if the contract
speciﬁes all possible contingencies. In reality, it is hard to provide a complete con-
tract for complex projects. In this case, renegotiations could be eﬃciency-enhancing
unless they are abused. However, each party (more likely a contractor in procure-
ment auction) uses the renegotiation to seek rents.6 Once a contractor begins to
6The general explanation of incomplete contracts builds upon the existence of transaction costs
associated with specifying all the contingencies for a complete contract. According to transaction
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work, the procurer would have little bargaining power relative to the contractor
since there is no alternative contractor to complete the project. When the procurer
is faced with a hold-up problem (i.e. lower bargaining power) the contractor would
utilize the renegotiations as an opportunity of a windfall transfer to him. Therefore,
some literature considers renegotiation as the form of opportunism causing ineﬃ-
ciencies.7 Iossa, Spagnolo, and Vellez (2007) argue that renegotiations can have
negative eﬀects on ex ante eﬃciency because of a bidder’s weak incentive to reduce
cost or to improve quality when the contractor expects future favor renegotiation.
They argue that the expectation of renegotiation in the ﬁeld also distorts bidder’s
bidding behavior in the auction letting. In particular, bidders have incentives to
bid aggressively to maximize the probability of winning, and the winner calls for a
renegotiation to change the original contract.
Wang (2000) includes a possibility of renegotiation in a theoretical model of
sealed bid auction. He shows that the likelihood of renegotiation will be low as
long as either cost of renegotiation or the number of bidders increases. He presents
that the social welfare with renegotiation could be lower than that without rene-
gotiation if the procurer does not have full bargaining power in the renegotiation.
As more bidders participate in auction, the bids are uniformly closer to the actual
cost and the possibility of renegotiation is low in the procurement auction. Oudot
(2006) identiﬁes uncertainty as one of the main determinants of renegotiations in
French defense procurement contracts. In the study, the sources of the uncertainty
are speciﬁc to the defense sector such as contractual uncertainty or technological
uncertainty.
cost theory, incomplete contracts occur mostly because of the presence of transaction costs. Hart
and Holmstrom (1987) identify the sources of transactions costs: (1) the cost of foreseeing the
various contingencies that may occur; (2) the cost of making an agreement to deal with such
contingencies; (3) the cost of writing the complete contract; (4) the cost of legal enforcement.
7Williamson (1985) means that “opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure
of information, especially to calculated eﬀorts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise
confuse” (p. 47).
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In the road construction industry, renegotiation can occur with price adjust-
ments due to input price changes. Bidders are exposed to the risk of unanticipated
changes in cost of major inputs such as fuel (gas and diesel), asphalt (cement) or
steel. Therefore, it is apparent that rational bidders inﬂate their bids to reduce risk
exposure in a long-term contract. This bidder’s bidding strategy eventually causes
the increases in the payments paid by the public sector. Thus, a number of states
introduce a price adjustment clause as one type of renegotiations on the contract to
relieve contractors of extreme volatility of the input prices (for a more discussion of
this, see Kosmopoulou and Zhou (2014)).
Guasch (2004) examines around 1,000 concession contracts in Latin America
during 1990s. The study ﬁnds that competitive bidding, price-cap regulation, con-
tracts with investment requirements, absence of a regulatory agency at the work
site, macroeconomic shocks, and political cycles will aﬀect the incidence of renego-
tiations. Contractors initiated 57% of renegotiations while the government initiated
only 27% of renegotiations in the transportation sector during the sample periods.
Hsieh, Lu, and Wu (2004) investigate 90 metropolitan public work projects in Tai-
wan. Being consistent with the literature, this study also ﬁnds that the most change
orders result from incomplete planning and designs. The renegotiation amounts ac-
count for 10-17% variations of total project costs in the public works. Bordat,
McCullouch, and Sinha (2004) demonstrate that the proportion of the diﬀerence
between the winning and second bid has positive eﬀect on the frequency of change
orders. They also ﬁnd that the larger the contract size, the more likely the project
experiences time delays in completion.
An extensive empirical literature recently focuses more on structural models of
equilibrium bidding, which assume that the observed bids are the outcomes of the
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.8 The goal of this approach in empirical work on auc-
8Hendricks and Paarsch (1995), Athey and Haile (2007), and Hendricks and Porter (2007)
provide extensive surveys of the structural analysis. In particular, Athey and Haile (2007) highlight
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tions is to recover the underlying distribution of bidder’s valuations from auction
data. The estimation procedures require econometricians to ﬁnd the joint distribu-
tion of private signals from observed bids. In general, there are two ways to estimate
the distribution: parametric or nonparametric approaches. Although nonparametric
analysis is more ﬂexible, economists often have to make functional form assump-
tions on the distribution of bidder valuations to identify the structural parameters
due to complex theoretical model or limited data availability. Donald and Paarsch
(1993) develop the parametric structural estimation and propose maximum likeli-
hood methods for estimating the distributions. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) study
eBay coin auctions with endogenous entry and they estimate parametric auction
models by specifying likelihood function. On the other hand, Guerre, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2000) propose a two step procedure for nonparametrically estimating dis-
tribution of bidders’ private values from observed bids in a symmetric independent
private value framework.
Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) and Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006)have
developed methods to distinguish the values between private and common value
components by formulating nonparametric tests.9 The distinction between values
is important in policy aspects. For example, if common component is the main
determinant of bids, high competition does not guarantee lower procurement costs
while lower procurement costs could be achieved in competitive market with private
value environments. Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002) and Campo, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2003) extend nonparametric estimation by allowing bidder asymmetry with
aﬃliated private values which is an intermediate case between private and common
value auction.
nonparametric estimation which we employ in our essays.
9If each bidder knows its own valuation and no bidder knows with certainty other bidders’
values of the object, such a speciﬁcation is called private value model. In a common value en-
vironment, the object has an identical value for all bidders and the valuation is unknown at the
bidding.
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Other empirical auction literature focuses on multidimensional attributes in pro-
curement auction. Che (1993) and Lewis and Bajari (2011) analyze scoring auction
mechanism that includes quality and completion time in the awarding process, re-
spectively. Marion (2007) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) consider the eﬀect
of bid preference programs for small businesses on the overall cost of procurement in
California. In a related study of the policy eﬀect, De Silva, Dunne, Kosmopoulou,
and Lamarche (2012) analyze the eﬀect of subcontracting goals on bidding behav-
iors and procurement costs in Texas. De Silva, Dunne, and Kosmopoulou (2003)
investigate the bidding behaviors of entrants and incumbents and ﬁnd entrants bid
more aggressively. Lewis and Bajari (2014) examine how incentive contracts aﬀect
contractors’ work rate and completion days taken, and then ﬁnd evidence of ex-post
moral hazard in highway procurement.
In the nonparametric structural estimation, we estimate the latent cost distribu-
tions of bidders by controlling for bidder, auction characteristics and factors aﬀecting
the economic environment. In the count model analysis we take into account the
possibility of endogeneity of top ﬁrms in the market. The rest of the dissertation
is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the ﬁrst essay, “Strategic Bidding and
Contract Renegotiation.” Chapter 3 includes the second essay, “Renegotiation on
Incomplete Procurement Contracts.” The third essay, “Uncertainty and Contract
Renegotiation in Public Procurement”, is presented in Chapter 4. The last chapter
oﬀers concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Bidding and Contract
Renegotiation1
2.1 Introduction
Contractual incompleteness is a natural, perhaps unavoidable attribute of procure-
ment for complex projects. A consequence is that there are often signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between the original contract speciﬁcations and the actual labor and materials
required when the project is ﬁnally brought to completion. Such discrepancies lead
to extensive, costly ex post renegotiations between procuring agencies and con-
tractors. The U.S. government’s procurement guidelines, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), prohibit ex post price changes to a contract unless an item is
added in the ﬁeld or there is a relevant price adjustment clause. However, quantity
adjustments are common, and ﬁrms that anticipate quantity renegotiation often
modify their bidding strategies accordingly. In Athey and Levin (2001), for exam-
ple, contractors are able to increase their proﬁts by submitting high (low) unit prices
on items in anticipation of unit additions (deductions) after they begin work on a
1This chapter is based on a working paper coauthored with Georgia Kosmopoulou, Carlos
Lamarche and Richard Sicotte.
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project. This study examines how the prospect of ex post renegotiation in road
construction aﬀects outlays by the Vermont Agency of Transportation, placing the
focus on the impact of positive quantity adjustments.
Existing work (see Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) and Athey and Levin
(2001)) assumes that bidders have perfect foresight and can anticipate renegotiation
with accuracy. We assume that bidders form expectations based on the historical
frequencies of renegotiation at the item level and the need for such adjustments.
First, we employ reduced form estimation in order to study the relationship between
bidding behavior and the diﬀerent forms of contract renegotiation, while control-
ling for a variety of factors, including competition, local market power and ﬁrms’
debt to asset ratios. We then restrict our focus to a set of contracts that ﬁt the
Independent Private Value (IPV) model and consider one of the most costly forms
of renegotiation, namely, positive quantity adjustments. Positive quantity adjust-
ments, as opposed to price adjustments or new item additions, are reimbursed at a
price that is determined by the contractor at the bidding stage. As such, there are
incentives for bid manipulation that are absent in price adjustments where market
based indexes are used.
Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) show that renegotiations in standard low
price procurement auctions may generate signiﬁcant additional transaction costs.
In their study of the California highway construction industry, they estimate these
costs to be $2.20 for every dollar worth of positive quantity adjustments. Fur-
thermore, renegotiations often distort contractors’ ex ante incentives. Bidders may
consider renegotiations as an opportunity to seek additional rents. Iossa, Spagnolo,
and Vellez (2007) argue that renegotiations can have negative impact on ex ante
eﬃciency because a bidder has weak incentives to reduce cost or improve quality.
The FAR guidelines demonstrate a clear preference for simple competitive price-
based auctions. However, Bajari and Tadelis (2006) and Chong, Staropoli, and
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Yvrande-Billon (2009), argue that renegotiations may improve eﬃciency in procure-
ment when projects are complex or when less potential competition is expected.
Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2009) assert that procurement oﬃcials should be al-
lowed more ﬂexibility in awarding contracts based on the characteristics of projects
and bidders. One such example is that many projects require large amounts of mate-
rials, such as asphalt, that are subject to substantial price volatility. Kosmopoulou
and Zhou (2014) and Kosmopoulou, Lamarche, and Zhou (2014) ﬁnd that the in-
troduction of price adjustment clauses in procurement contracting has beneﬁted
signiﬁcantly the Oklahoma Department of Transportation as bids are more compet-
itive and the failure rate of ﬁrms is lower, creating net savings to the state program.
When a framework for renegotiations exists and reimbursements are independent of
a contractor’s bid level the eﬀects of renegotiation on the budget can be positive.
Reimbursement for quantity renegotiation is not independent of the initial bid and
as such creates the potential for bidders to increase their markups through relative
bid distortions.
A study of the size of adjustments due to renegotiation at the project level
can be used to assess the overall impact of uncertainty and ﬁrm heterogeneity on
markups, but the test may confound such eﬀects with inﬂuences from a number of
sources, including coordination and dispute resolution costs. We circumvent this
problem by focusing our analysis on a subsample of projects that have a similar set
of tasks, and whose characteristics closely ﬁt the IPV model. We use nonparametric
estimation methods similar to the ones developed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2000) and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) to estimate the distribution of
latent costs after controlling for the remaining project heterogeneity. We employ
itemized bid information to construct estimates of the markup of bids above costs,
and we compare how they vary across auctions with and without positive quantity
renegotiation. The variation in markups across items with diﬀering probabilities of
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renegotiation provides evidence on how ﬁrms’ anticipation of change orders aﬀects
their bidding behavior. Our approach also permits us to conduct counterfactual
experiments to measure how changes in the probability of renegotiation shifts our
estimated distribution of ﬁrms’ costs and markups.
Our sample consists of all highway construction projects let via the standard low
price auction procedure in the state of Vermont over a ﬁve-year period. We ﬁrst
estimate the model at the project-level, and in contrast to Bajari, Houghton, and
Tadelis (2014), we ﬁnd that increases in ﬁrms’ costs on projects with renegotiations
do not increase disproportionately relative to projects without renegotiations. This
does not rule out the possibility of adaptation costs, but it does suggest that any
adaptation costs that occur as a result of renegotiations at the item-level are not
large enough to be detected when placed in the context of overall project costs. We
ﬁnd, however, that the magnitude of estimated markups is systematically higher for
the project group experiencing positive quantity renegotiation; it varies across the
quartiles of the distribution having a 3-4% diﬀerence at the median level. Consider-
ing itemized bids, both unit costs and markups are increased among items that were
renegotiated after a project was awarded and the diﬀerences are more pronounced.
Our results also suggest that while bidders increase their markups on items that
have a high likelihood of renegotiation by 10-11% at the median level, they lower
their bids and markups on items that are not renegotiated, to maximize their po-
tential surplus ex post while maintaining the likelihood to win at a high level. The
behavior leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the cost of contracting to the state and the
public, higher than that reported by studies considering all forms of renegotiation,
rather than focusing like we do on quantity adjustments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of
the data. In Section 2.3, we present the model and our identiﬁcation strategy and
discuss structural empirical analysis. Section 2.4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
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2.2 Data and summary statistics
2.2.1 An overview of change orders on Vermont transporta-
tion contracts
Our dataset consists of the complete bidding and payment records of all construc-
tion projects auctioned oﬀ between May 2004 and December 2009 by the Vermont
Agency of Transportation (VTrans). There are 857 bids (more than 50,000 item-
ized bids) on 312 individual projects. We classify auctions by project type: asphalt
projects, bridge projects and miscellaneous projects.2 The weekly sealed-bid auc-
tions award the contract to the lowest bidder. When advertising a project to the
public, VTrans provides detailed engineer’s plans and information on the work site,
the required completion date and a brief description of the project.3 The engineer’s
plans provide a list of quantities for each item in the project plan. All participants
in the auctions are required to submit bids for each item level on the list. The auc-
tion data include information on the identities of plan-holders, the identities of all
bidders, their bids, the winning bid and engineering cost estimate for a project. Fur-
thermore, we have a dataset on change orders, which includes the proposed quantity
and unit-price for each renegotiated item within a contract and a brief description of
the reasons for that change. Article 7.2.1 of AIA (American Institute of Architects,
2007) A201 deﬁnes a change order as follows:
“A Change Order is a written instrument prepared by the Architect and
signed by the Owner, Contractor and Architect stating their agreement
2Miscellaneous projects include traﬃc signaling and lighting, grading and draining, parking
lots and landscaping.
3Prequaliﬁcation status is achieved by the successful completion of two procedures: (1) an-
nual prequaliﬁcation: the prequaliﬁcation committee at VTrans annually assigns each ﬁrm certain
limitations as to the value of projects and number contracts that they are allowed to undertake
in Vermont; (2) contract prequaliﬁcation: the process to obtain permission to submit a bid for a
particular contract for a contractor who already obtained annual prequaliﬁcation. See the Ver-
mont Agency of Transportation Policies and Procedures on prequaliﬁcation, bidding, and award
of contracts for more details.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Min Max Number ofDeviation Observations
Itemized Relative Bid 1.162 0.673 0.000 4.000 50,465(before Change Orders)
Itemized Bidding Amount $0.028 $0.124 $0.000 $5.077 50,465
Winning Bid Amount $1.806 $2.260 $0.025 $21.983 312
Engineering Cost Estimate of $1.910 $2.432 $0.026 $24.552 312the Winning Contract
Change Orders Amount $0.174 $0.323 -$0.117 $2.331 256
Bidding Amount $1.723 $2.282 $0.025 $29.505 857
Relative Bid (before Change Orders: 1.092 0.277 0.500 2.339 857(Bid / Engineering Cost Estimate)
Relative Winning Bid 0.977 0.190 0.436 1.564 256(before Change Orders)
Relative Payment Amount 1.056 0.228 0.532 2.014 256(after Change Orders)
Price Adjustment Amount $0.221 $0.240 $0.006 $1.047 41
Positive Quantity Adjustment $0.154 $0.225 $0.000 $1.259 185
New Added Item Amount $0.149 $0.312 $0.000 $2.689 222
Negative Quantity Adjustment -$0.119 $0.295 -$2.266 -$0.000 87
Dropped Item Amount -$0.122 $0.250 -$1.591 -$0.000 130
Bidders (per Contract) 3.349 1.959 1.000 11.000 312
Plan-holder (per Contract) 5.026 3.163 1.000 16.000 312
Complexity 60.228 35.346 2.000 245.000 312(Number of Distinct Items per Contract)
All monetary ﬁgures are expressed in millions of dollars.
upon all of the following: .1 The change in the Work; .2 The amount of
the adjustment, if any, in the Contract Sum; and .3 The extent of the
adjustment, if any, in the Contract Time.”
Change orders are widely used in ﬁxed-price contracts and are ﬁlled only if
changes of plans or speciﬁcations are signiﬁcant relative to the original contracts.4
They include ex post payments made by positive quantity, price adjustments and
new added item adjustments as well as payments made to VTrans due to negative
quantity and dropped item adjustments. Hence, we have information on the actual
quantity used in the ﬁeld and the actual ex post payments in a contract.
4For example, in the state of Vermont, a change order is recorded when it results in a cost
increase of 5% or more on the item or causes an increase in the contract total pay amount.
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Table 2.1 provides summary auction and change order statistics for the period
of analysis. Winning bids on contracts are $1,805,793 with an engineering cost
estimate of $1,910,227. Two hundred and ﬁfty six contracts were supplemented by
change orders making up 82.05% of construction projects auctioned oﬀ during our
sample period. The average change order amount per contract is $173,582. The
relative bid, calculated as the bid divided by the engineer’s cost estimate, is used
as a measure of bidding aggressiveness. On average ﬁrms bid 9.20% above the
engineering cost estimate and win with bids that are 2.30% below the engineering
cost estimate. The relative ﬁnal payment amount to winners resulting from the
change order is 5.60% above the engineering cost estimate. In other words, winning
bidders negotiate a 7.90% increase in payment relative to the winning bid. There
is, on average, $221,207 paid to contractors due to price adjustments, $154,392
due to positive quantity adjustment and $148,570 due to new added item amounts.
In addition, -$119,065 and -$121,593 are the average payments ﬁrms make to the
state when there are negative quantity adjustments and dropped item amounts,
respectively. The type of renegotiation most frequently observed among projects
during our sample period is related to new added items (86.72% of projects with
renegotiations), followed by positive quantity adjustments (72.27% of projects with
renegotiations). On average, the number of bidders and the number of prequaliﬁed
plan-holders are 3.35 and 5.03 per auction, respectively. The number of diﬀerent
items in the contract is used as a proxy for project complexity. The average number
of items per contract is 60.
Figure 2.1 oﬀers a nonparametric estimate of the probability density function of
relative winning bids of initial contracts against the ﬁnal relative payment amounts.
It illustrates one of the striking features of contracting: change orders tend to in-
crease payments for the state, and the increase tends to be more pronounced in the
upper tail of the distribution. Diﬀerent types of adjustments present vastly diﬀer-
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Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Plot of Relative Winning Bids
ent challenges for the transportation agencies. Price adjustments are based on a
market index that is independent of ﬁrms’ reported bids.5 They are triggered by
ﬂuctuations in the price of oil caused by economic uncertainty. In contrast, quan-
tity adjustments lead to direct bid skewness that is not observed in the presence
of other types of change orders, and merit more attention. Those adjustments are
often due to errors in the engineers’ plans that might be recognized by experienced
contractors. Our goal is to investigate whether there are indeed distinct eﬀects that
are more prominent when quantity adjustments become commonplace.
5The price adjustment amount depends upon the magnitude of deviation of the average fuel
price from the index price during the project construction period and the quantities of the contract
pay items subject to the price adjustment clauses. In this study, all projects have positive price
adjustments, due to the continuous upward trend in oil prices over the period of our data.
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2.2.2 Reduced form estimation
This section presents a set of descriptive regressions to investigate the eﬀect of
renegotiation on bidding behavior. The basic model is as follows:
yiat = X
0
at +W
0
it + Z
0
t +mt + i + uiat; (2.1)
where the dependent variable, yiat, is the logarithm of bid submitted by bidder i, in
auction a, in month t. The independent variables comprise factors used to control for
observed heterogeneity across bidders and projects. We include 1) auction speciﬁc
characteristics (X), 2) bidder speciﬁc characteristics (W), and 3) variables measur-
ing general economic conditions (Z). Table A.1 in the appendix provides a detailed
deﬁnition on these independent variables. The model also includes monthly dummy
variables, mt’s, and ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects, i’s. The error term uiat is assumed to be
the sum of an auction speciﬁc eﬀect and a disturbance term i.e., uiat = a + iat.
As mentioned earlier, there are ﬁve diﬀerent avenues for additional payments to
and from contractors: price adjustment, positive quantity adjustment, new added
item amounts, negative quantity adjustment and dropped item amounts. Their
amounts are used at the auction level as independent variables in our analysis. The
vector X includes measures of size and proxies of project uncertainty such as the log
of the state’s cost estimate of the project and the calendar days required to complete
a project. The number of project components is used as a proxy for the complexity
and the variable elevation captures related diﬀerences in the work site conditions.
We control for diﬀerences in competition with the variable expected number of
bidders, which incorporates the probability that a plan-holder will participate in
the auction.6 We also use the “project type” dummy to control for bidding behavior
across diﬀerent types of projects.
6In Vermont, plan-holders’ identities are publicly available if the number of qualiﬁed plan-
holders is larger than 3.
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We include a number of variables to control for bidder and rival characteristics.
Consistent with prior literature, we construct each bidder’s and rival’s distance to
work sites and their backlogs. We also include detailed ﬁnancial information on
each bidder such as assets, debt and revenue.7 The information allows us to mea-
sure business strength and capacity more accurately, rather than resorting to local
workloads as a proxy of ﬁrm activity based on state-level data.8 We construct a
ﬁnancial leverage ratio, namely, the debt to asset ratio, in order to measure a ﬁrm’s
bidding reaction to ﬁnancial constraints. Clayton and Ravid (2002) empirically test
how the level of leverage aﬀects optimal bidding behavior in a private value setting.
Their empirical analysis of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum
auctions found that ﬁrms with more debt are more likely to bid less competitively.
Kosmopoulou, Lamarche, and Zhou (2014) also show that smaller, typically ﬁnan-
cially constrained ﬁrms react positively to measures that reduce uncertainty.
In order to account for heterogeneity in size and experience across bidders, we
designate a bidder as a top ﬁrm if its annual revenue is greater than 15% of the
total value of all ﬁrms’ revenues each year during the sample period.9 To control
for the possibility of systematic diﬀerences in the behavior of top ﬁrms and fringe
ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints, we interact the debt to asset ratio with a variable
indicating whether a bidder is a top ﬁrm. In addition, we also allow for diﬀerential
bidding behavior in local markets by incorporating a measure of a bidder’s local
market power as an account of a ﬁrm’s market share. A ﬁrm’s local market power is
deﬁned by its working history at a county level. It is the proportion of all outstanding
7Firms are required to provide ﬁnancial information to VTrans in order to become qualiﬁed
bidders. We obtained ﬁnancial data about the ﬁrms from documents maintained by the Vermont
Agency of Transportation.
8Vermont is a small state and almost half of the headquarters of contractors are located outside
the state. Without knowing ﬁrms’ business activity out of state we will not be able to assess the
eﬀect of their capacity constraints on bidding.
9The highway construction market is highly concentrated in Vermont. Based on 15% revenue
threshold used in our analysis, we assign, on average, only 5% of the total ﬁrms in the market as
top ﬁrms. The threshold allows us to assign a similar proportion of top ﬁrms to that in Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis (2014).
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work in a county that is undertaken by a given ﬁrm. High values are associated
with a ﬁrm having a dominant position in that county. Finally, it is also important
to control for factors that aﬀect the general economic conditions. We include two
control variables, namely, a three month average of the number of building permits
issued in the state and unemployment rate to capture the local business climate.
Notice that we also use diﬀerent sample sizes in this reduced form analysis.
While we estimate the model using the full set of data, we also estimate the model
with the subsample of projects used in the structural estimation of section 2.3. In
Table 2.2, we estimate the models using ordinary least squares (OLS) with clustered
standard errors (column (1)) and then ﬁxed eﬀects to account for ﬁrms’ diﬀerent
eﬃciency levels (columns (2)-(6)). The introduction of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects controls
for any additional idiosyncratic characteristic of individual bidders that may drive
bidding strategies. We report cluster-robust standard errors where clustering is at
the auction level.
Lastly, this analysis also includes the itemized bid estimation with the unit of
observation being an itemized bid during the period of analysis. For this analysis, we
use similar control variables as in the project level speciﬁcations but we also include
item ﬁxed eﬀects to capture diﬀerent characteristics of tasks.10 Furthermore, we
classify all items into three groups: items with ex post quantity overruns, items
with ex post quantity under-runs, and items with no quantity changes ex post.
There are 712 diﬀerent items used during the sample period. Of those, 498 items
never appear on a change order.
Results from this estimation are displayed in Table 2.2. The coeﬃcient on the ex
post positive quantity adjustment amount is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the itemized level, indicating that when bidders anticipate larger amounts of positive
quantity adjustment, they bid less aggressively. Meanwhile, the variable related to
10In particular, we measure positive quantity adjustment, negative quantity adjustment and
dropped item amounts at the itemized level for the itemized bid analysis.
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Table 2.2: Regression Results for a Model of Bids
Project Bids Itemized Bids
Full Sample Subsample Full Sample
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive Quantity Adjustment 0.096 0.121 0.011**
(0.079) (0.090) (0.005)
Negative Quantity Adjustment -0.082 -0.153 -0.003***
(0.100) (0.098) (0.000)
Price Adjustment -0.198* -0.276** -0.088 -0.203**
(0.107) (0.108) (0.155) (0.080)
Dropped Item Amount -0.199 -0.244* -0.111 -0.007**
(0.129) (0.130) (0.253) (0.004)
New Added Item Amount -0.091 -0.134 -0.053 0.048***
(0.116) (0.115) (0.246) (0.017)
Change Order Indicator 0.067** 0.036
(0.027) (0.046)
Positive Quantity Indicator 0.031
(0.042)
Log of Engineer’s Estimate 0.916*** 0.888*** 0.869*** 0.857*** 0.864*** 0.898***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.041) (0.042) (0.005)
Log of Calendar Days 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.002 0.004 0.036**
(0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.046) (0.049) (0.016)
Complexity 0.053 0.022 0.076 0.361** 0.348** -0.005
(0.073) (0.071) (0.069) (0.154) (0.157) (0.033)
Expected Number of Bidders -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.018 -0.013 -0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.049) (0.053) (0.004)
Distance to the Project Location -0.002 -0.020 -0.015 -0.028 -0.035 0.017
(0.022) (0.031) (0.033) (0.067) (0.069) (0.021)
Rival’s Minimum Distance to -0.019 0.032 0.048 -0.051 -0.055 -0.015
the Project Location (0.030) (0.034) (0.037) (0.078) (0.081) (0.030)
Time Dummy Yes Yes No No No Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects (55) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Item Fixed Eﬀects (709) No No No No No Yes
Observations 857 857 857 141 141 50,465
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% and * denotes signiﬁcance
at the 10% level. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Continued
Project Bids Itemized Bids
Full Sample Subsample Full Sample
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Firm -0.030 -0.017 0.028 0.023 0.018 -0.085***
(0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.062) (0.064) (0.032)
Local Market Power -0.115*** -0.094*** -0.054**
(0.028) (0.031) (0.025)
Debt to Asset Ratio -0.076 -0.101 0.137*
(0.047) (0.091) (0.081)
Debt to Asset Ratio* Top Firm -0.278 -1.466 -1.302
(0.335) (1.121) (0.914)
Elevation 0.002 0.002 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Log of Firm’s Backlog 0.002 0.002 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Log of Rival’s Minimum Backlog -0.001 -0.003 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Average Number of Building -0.003 -0.003 -0.009
Permits (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.013*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Asphalt Project 0.054 0.007 0.014
(0.051) (0.051) (0.031)
Bridge Project 0.088 -0.011 -0.034
(0.054) (0.052) (0.031)
Time Dummy Yes Yes No No No Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects (55) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Item Fixed Eﬀects (709) No No No No No Yes
Observations 857 857 857 141 141 50,465
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% and * denotes
signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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the ex post negative quantity adjustment is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
at the itemized level. The direction of these adjustments allows us to conclude
that bidders are likely to manipulate their bids in anticipation of ex post quantity
adjustments to increase their ex post reimbursements. By doing so, bidders increase
the probability to win the project, and later recover their forgone proﬁts. This is
consistent with theory (see Athey and Levin (2001)). The result that the quantity
adjustment coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the itemized level, and are not
statistically signiﬁcant at the project level, lends support to the hypothesis that
ﬁrms engage in bid skewing that leaves overall bid levels more or less constant.
The coeﬃcient on the ex post price adjustment amount is negative and statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Thus, considering the variable on price adjustment, ﬁrms bid
more aggressively when there is a price adjustment mechanism in place. The evi-
dence is consistent with Kosmopoulou and Zhou (2014), who postulate that price
adjustment clauses that are based on an index may produce direct cost savings to
state agencies. With no price adjustment in place, bidders are exposed to the risk of
unanticipated changes in the cost of major inputs. As a result, they increase their
bids to reduce risk exposure in long-term contracts. In contrast with some previous
work, we include price adjustment clauses in our reduced-form model presented in
equation (2.1). If these are not controlled for, their eﬀects on bidding behavior may
bias the estimated eﬀects of other factors, including the anticipation of quantity
adjustments.
The anticipation of addition of new items in the ﬁeld as a sign of uncertainty
makes bidders more likely to bid less aggressively at the itemized level, but the
variable is not statistically signiﬁcant at the project level. Under perfect foresight
and without consideration of the consequence of submitting unbalanced bids, bidders
would be expected to bid zero on items that will be eventually dropped from a
project. We observe lower bids on these items in our sample. The engineering cost
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estimate and the log of calendar days have the expected impact on the bid. In
particular, the engineer cost estimates explain almost all of the variation in our
dependent variables. As Tadelis (2012) recently argued, more complex projects
are expected to experience ex post renegotiations in ﬁxed price contracts due to
contractual incompleteness. Bidders are more likely to incorporate a premium for
ex post uncertainty or engineering error into their bids. The impact of the expected
number of bidders is consistent with our expectation. Increased level of competition
causes bidders to bid more aggressively.
Among the variables controlling for the relative strengths of bidders and rivals,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with signiﬁcant local market power bid more aggressively. This
result suggests that project location is one of the critical determinants of bidding.
In the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcations at the itemized level, the debt to asset ratio is
statistically signiﬁcant and positive, implying that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms bid
less aggressively at the item level. Likewise, the elevation of work site is statistically
signiﬁcant only in the itemized bid speciﬁcation. The variable on backlog is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, showing that capacity constrained ﬁrms bid less aggres-
sively. The magnitude of this estimate is small in this case, perhaps showing that
the contractual commitment of ﬁrms in Vermont relative to their overall workload
could be small.
Bidding behavior can be aﬀected by business cycle ﬂuctuations. Bidders bid
more aggressively when faced with a high unemployment rate, which indicates a
decline in economic activity. Bids can be low and more competitive during recessions
and higher during expansions. Intuitively, the opportunity cost of losing a contract
is much higher for ﬁrms during a recession while they are more likely to seek higher
proﬁt margins when more opportunities for work become available.
The bidding model described in equation (2.1) relies on a linear speciﬁcation
of the bids on a set of observable project, bidder characteristics and measures of
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economic ﬂuctuation. An alternative structural approach is currently used in the
empirical auction literature by assuming that the observed bids are the Bayesian
Nash Equilibria of the theoretical model. This structural approach is used to recover
the latent primitives of the auction model. In order to examine the impact of con-
tract renegotiation on strategic bidding, it is crucial to control for the competitive
environment and project heterogeneity associated with contract renegotiation. The
next section employs structural approaches that will allow us to control for compe-
tition while relaxing the assumptions behind equation (2.1) generating estimates of
the latent cost distributions for projects with or without renegotiations.
Lastly, the analysis in the third column of Table 2.2 shows that projects that have
ex post renegotiations have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent bidding pattern than projects
that do not have ex post renegotiations. This naturally raises a concern about
the possibility of a type of selection bias in the structural analysis. The model
presented in the third column is estimated with a restricted set of covariates that
includes auction speciﬁc characteristics and bidder observable variables, as in Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). The ﬁrst set of variables is expected to be associ-
ated with whether a project is likely to have ex post renegotiations. For instance,
it is anticipated that a larger and more complex project has a higher likelihood of
renegotiation than a small and less complex project. We also include observable
bidder variables such as ﬁrm’s distance to project location and a variable indicating
whether a bidder is a top ﬁrm. In the analysis that follows, we overcome selection
issues by using subsets of projects with and without renegotiations. We refer the
reader to Subsection 2.3 where we explain in detail how we obtain subsets of homo-
geneous projects. In contrast to our results using the full sample, when we estimate
the model using only the subsample of homogeneous projects the indicator variable
of a change order is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. This result might be inter-
preted as evidence suggesting that a change order is randomly assigned conditional
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on observable covariates.
It is immediately apparent that to compare projects and items with and without
renegotiation, as shown in the next sections, we require that the ex-post probability
of renegotiation for selected items is not one. Table 2.3 oﬀers evidence on the ex-
post probability that an item is renegotiated considering the 712 items we have
in our sample of 50,465 observations. Because it is naturally impossible to report
on the frequencies for all tasks considered in our sample of projects, we rank the
items by their likelihood of positive quantity adjustment and present the top 5 and
bottom 5 items.11 For instance, the task associated with Superpave Bituminous
Concrete Pavement, or item 490.30, has roughly 1/3 chances of being renegotiated,
while work on installing Galvanized Steel Beam Guardrail, or item 631.17, has not
been renegotiated despite it is frequently included in the project plans. These data
are indicative of the overall pattern: while some items tend to be included in change
orders only very rarely, if ever, other items are renegotiated in approximately one out
of every four projects in which they are included. Thus, an experienced contractor,
who has been participating in the procurement auctions, might incorporate these
expectations into their bidding behavior. Indeed, in our own discussions with private
contractors and state engineers, they conﬁrm that they are keenly aware of the past
pattern of change orders on particular items and types of projects. This crucial
aspect is incorporated in the model developed in Section 2.3.1.
11The pay item description for the items presented in Table 2.3 is the following: 490.30: Super-
pave Bituminous Concrete Pavement, 406.25: Bituminous Concrete Pavement, 630.15: Flaggers,
406.27: Medium Duty Bituminous Concrete Pavement, 301.35: Subbase of Dense Graded Crushed
Stone, 529.20: Partial Removal of Structure, 621.21: HD Steel Beam Guardrail, Galvanized,
631.17: Testing Equipment, Bituminous, 208.35: Coﬀerdam Excavation, Rock and 620.17: Gate
for Chain-Link Fence, 2.4 m (8 feet).
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2.3 Structural Estimation
In this section, we develop a simple bidding framework by assuming an indepen-
dent private value (IPV) model with asymmetric bidders, which is closely related
to the previous literature such as Bajari and Ye (2003), Campo, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2003), and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). In the case of asymmetric
bidders, the distributions of costs vary by bidder, as opposed to the case of sym-
metric bidders in which private cost estimates are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). The asymmetries may arise from diﬀerent capacity
constraints, distances to work sites, cost eﬃciency levels, or work experience. In
this setting, we are able to express each bidder’s inverse bid function as a func-
tion of his rivals’ bid distributions and obtain the cost of bidding in projects with
renegotiations as well as the cost of bidding in projects without renegotiations. We
then employ nonparametric estimation methods similar to the ones in Guerre, Per-
rigne, and Vuong (2000), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006), and Bajari, Houghton,
and Tadelis (2014) to uncover cost distributions. Lastly, we oﬀer a series of coun-
terfactual exercises to investigate the eﬀect of renegotiations and strategic bidding
behavior.
2.3.1 Equilibrium bidding behavior
We derive equilibrium bidding functions assuming that bidders have prior beliefs
regarding the likelihood of renegotiations and then, we estimate the latent cost
distributions using observed bids. Consider a bidding function that is continuously
diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in cost. A project consists of a list of tasks,
t = 1; : : : ; T . By letting bit indicate bidder i’s unit price on an item t, we deﬁne a bid
price vector as bi = (bi1; : : : ; biT ). The estimated quantity for each task t is qet and its
actual quantity used to complete the task is denoted as qat . In vector notation they
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are qe = (qe1; : : : ; qeT ) and qa = (qa1 ; : : : ; qaT ) respectively. Let si =
PT
t=1 b
i
tq
e
t = b
i qe
be the vector product of unit prices and estimated quantities. In low price sealed
bid auctions, a bidder i wins a contract if he/she submits a bid that is the lowest,
i.e., bi qe < bj qe, 8i 6= j. Then, if bidder i bids si, the probability that his bid is
greater than j’s is deﬁned as Hj(si)  pr(bi qe > bj qe). Finally,
Q
j 6=i(1 Hj(si))
is deﬁned as the probability that bidder i wins the auction with si.
Unlike Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) who assume bidders have rational
expectations over actual quantities, we assume that bidders know that the speciﬁ-
cation about an item is incomplete or has an error, and that additional work may
be necessary. In our model bidders form expectations about future adjustments on
each item based on its historical frequency of renegotiation. A breakdown of items
by the probability of renegotiation, k, includes two types of items: items that are
not renegotiated (kt = 0), and items that are renegotiated (kt > 0). With probabil-
ity kt the speciﬁcation about an item is incomplete or contains an error, while with
probability (1 - kt) the original speciﬁcation or plan accurately describes the task.
Firm i’s expected proﬁt is bi   ci if it wins the project and zero otherwise. We
deﬁne bidder i’s expected proﬁt function as follows:
i(bi; ci;k)
=

bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)  ci  (k  qat + (1  k)  qe)
 pr  bi  qe < bj  qe
=

bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)  ci  (k  qat + (1  k)  qe)

24Y
j 6=i
(1 Hj(si))
35 ; (2.2)
where the vector 1 is a T -dimensional vector of ones. Note that the proﬁt function
of the ith ﬁrm is equal to the expected markup times the probability that ﬁrm i is
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the lowest bidder. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) is equal to:
@i(bi; ci;k)
@bit
= (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)
24Y
j 6=i
(1 Hj(si))
35  bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)
 ci  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)
24qet X
k 6=i
hk(s
i)
Y
j 6=i;k
(1 Hj(si))
35 = 0: (2.3)
Since
h
qet
P
k 6=i hk(s
i)Qj 6=i;k(1 Hj(si))i is equal to @si@bit @[Qj 6=i(1 Hj(si))]@si as shown
in the Appendix B, we write the ﬁrst order condition as,
(bi   ci)  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe) =

ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet
qet


0@X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
1A 1 : (2.4)
Equation (2.4) expresses the FOC as a function of the probability, kt, that item t is
renegotiated. If kt = 0 for all tasks t, then equation (2.4) can be written as follows:
(bi   ci)  qe =
0@X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
1A 1 : (2.5)
On the other hand, if kt > 0, the equation is expressed as follows:
(bi   ci)  ~qa =

ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet
qet
0@X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
1A 1 (2.6)
where the vector ~qa = k(qa   qe) + qe represents a weighted average of actual and
estimated quantities. In the next sections, we uncover the latent cost distributions
in the case of positive quantity adjustments, ~qat > qet for at least one task t.
2.3.2 Nonparametric estimation
This section follows closely Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), Haile, Hong, and
Shum (2006) and De Silva, Dunne, Kosmopoulou, and Lamarche (2012) to estimate
the equilibrium bidding functions for projects with and without renegotiation. We
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employ a nonparametric approach that allows one to directly control for auction
heterogeneity in the ﬁrst step of the two-step procedure.
Let r = f0; 1g denote projects without ex post renegotiation and with ex post
renegotiation. We ﬁrst estimate a reduced form regression while controlling for
auction-speciﬁc and bidder-speciﬁc characteristics,
y
(mr)
rj  b(mr)rj  qe(mr) = 0rx(mr)rj + 0rz(mr) + "(mr)rj ; (2.7)
where the dependent variable y(mr)rj is a project bid amount by contractor j in an
auction mr. The vector x 2 X  Rpx includes controls for a ﬁrm’s distance and
its rival’s minimum distance to the work site, the indicator variable for a top ﬁrm,
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The variable z 2 Z  Rpz controls for auction-speciﬁc eﬀects
by including ex post price adjustment amounts, new added item amounts, dropped
item amounts, log of calendar days, complexity, number of bidders, and engineer’s
cost estimate. The vector z also includes contractor ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
unobserved bidder heterogeneity in the ﬁrst step of the structural estimation.12;13
Recall that si = biqe and that the cumulative distribution function of contractor
j is deﬁned as Hj(si)  Pr(bjqe  si). Using equation (2.7) and substituting
the contractor j’s bid in the cumulative distribution function, we obtain that the
probability that bidder i’s bid is greater than bidder j’s bid is:
H
(mr)
rj (b) = Pr

0rx
(mr)
rj + 
0
rz
(mr) + "
(mr)
rj  sir

 G

b
(mr)
rj

; (2.8)
12We omit a description of an alternative speciﬁcation that included four additional variables:
local market power, debt/asset ratio, elevation and unemployment. The results are similar to
the ones presented in Table 2.6, and therefore, we oﬀer results based on a more parsimonious
model (2.7). This speciﬁcation include variables that are similar to the ones employed in Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis (2014).
13The results from estimating equation (2.7) were similar to the results presented in Table 2.2’s
column (4). Consequently, they are omitted to save space but they are available upon request. As
expected, the eﬀect of complexity and the logarithm of calendar days were signiﬁcant in projects
with renegotiations and insigniﬁcant in projects without renegotiations. The other estimated
eﬀects were insigniﬁcant with the exception of the engineer’s cost estimate.
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where b(mr)rj = sir  0rx(mr)rj   0rz(mr). Under i.i.d. assumptions on the error term ",
we estimate equation (2.7) using standard parametric models, obtain the residuals,
b"(mr)rj , and use b"rj to estimate the density and bid distribution for projects without
ex post renegotiation (r = 0) and with ex post renegotiation (r = 1), denoted by
hrj() and Hrj() respectively.14 We obtain bhrj and bHrj considering a continuously
diﬀerentiable kernel function deﬁned over a compact support and a properly chosen
bandwidth. We use a triweight kernel to estimate these density and distribution
functions,K(u) = (35=32)(1 u2)31fjuj  1g, and we select the bandwidth using the
form wr = ^(b"(mr)rj )(nrLrj) 1=6, where (b"(mr)rj ) is deﬁned as the standard deviation
of b"(mr)rj ,  = 2:9878  1:06, and Lrj is the number of auctions in which bidder j
participated.
Lastly, after estimating the density function, we are able to uncover the cost
distributions by solving the following two equations in terms of the unknowns ci0
and ci1,
(bi0   ci0)  qe =
 X
j 6=i
h^0j(s
i)
(1  H^0j(si))
! 1
(2.9)
(bi1   ci1)  q^a =
 
k^tq
a
t + (1  k^t)qet
qet
! X
j 6=i
h^1j(s
i)
(1  H^1j(si))
! 1
(2.10)
where k^t is an estimate of the probability of renegotiation and q^a = k^(qa   qe) +
qe. As in Table 2.3, we construct the historical probability of positive quantity
adjustment on a particular item by dividing the number of occurrences of such
adjustment with the number of occurrences on the original contracts. We denote
14It is interesting to observe that the parametrization of the model used in equation (2.7) can
be associated with diﬀerences in the estimated cumulative distribution function of contractor j.
Although it seems natural to estimate H separately for projects with and without renegotiations,
we implemented a variation of the model imposing that 0 = 1 =  and 0 = 1 = . We found
that the results shown in the next section are not sensitive to the parametrization used in equation
(2.7) (e.g., the median markup for projects with and without negotiations were quantitatively and
qualitatively similar to the ones reported below in Table 2.6).
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the solution of equations (2.9) and (2.10) by c^ = (c^00; c^01)0 which represent pseudo-
values of the costs of projects without and with ex post renegotiations, respectively.
2.3.3 Data
The estimation of equations (2.9) and (2.10) requires a subset of projects that have
a relatively similar set of tasks and ﬁt the IPV model. We restrict our attention to
road/highway projects with two or three bidders based on frequency. As De Silva,
Dunne, Kankanamge, and Kosmopoulou (2008) discuss in detail, the individual
bidder’s eﬃciency level is more critical to determine its cost in asphalt projects.
Bidders can estimate more accurately their costs for asphalt projects and less so for
bridge projects that are typically studied in a common value setting (see also Hong
and Shum (2002) and De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge, and Kosmopoulou (2008)).
Although equations (2.9) and (2.10) focus on item t, it is conceivable that there
are auctions that ﬁt the IPV framework and have other items with change orders.
It is convenient then to deﬁne three subsets of projects that corresponds to these
equations. We denote the subsets by SR, SA, and SB. Letm denote an auction and t
a task. The subset of interest is SR = f(mR; t) : qat > qet ; (mR; t) 2 ART g, where
AR is a set that includes road/highway contracts with positive quantity adjustments
and T represents a set of tasks. The subset of projects that were not renegotiated is
deﬁned as SA = f(mA; t) : qat = qet ; 8(mA; t) 2 AAT g, where AA includes projects
in which there is no positive quantity adjustment although it contains other change
orders (e.g., new added item adjustments and dropped items). Finally, we deﬁne an
alternative subset of non-renegotiated projects SB = f(mB; t) : qat = qet ; 8(mB; t) 2
AB  T g, where AB contains projects with no renegotiation at all.
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The descriptive statistics for these three groups are presented in Table 2.4. We
restrict attention to projects with an estimated cost between $200,000 and $5 mil-
lion, roughly excluding the largest and smallest 10% of road/highway projects to
achieve greater homogeneity across groups. As shown by the table, the more com-
plex a project is, the more likely it will be renegotiated. This essentially implies that
long and more complex projects are renegotiated with higher frequency. The issue
of auction heterogeneity is known to aﬀect the quality of statistical inferences and
consequently it is addressed by the estimation procedure described in the previous
sections which follows closely Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Haile, Hong, and
Shum (2006), and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014).
In comparing bid distributions of projects with and without renegotiations, item
heterogeneity is a challenging issue. Since projects can include more than one rene-
gotiated item, we restrict attention to projects in which, at most, one item is rene-
gotiated with positive quantity adjustment. We identiﬁed the six renegotiated items
in this process, as shown in Table 2.5, and focus on their cost estimates or their
markups at the itemized level.15 Those items that have positive quantity adjust-
ments in the subset SR are denoted by IR. Then, we select the same tasks from
the subsets of projects without renegotiation, SA and SB. Let IA and IB denote
subsets that include these items. As an illustrative example, while item 406.25 had
a positive quantity adjustment in 5 bids included in the subset SR, this item was
not renegotiated in 15 bids in the subset SA and 12 bids in the subset SB. Notice
that the itemized bid prices are similar among these groups while the itemized bid
amounts, which are the itemized bid prices multiplied by the estimated quantities
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across items between the subsamples.
15The pay item description for these six items is the following: 406.25: Bituminous Concrete
Pavement, 490.30: Superpave Bituminous Concrete Pavement, 617.10: Relocate Mailbox, Single
Support, 621.90: Temporary Traﬃc Barrier, 630.15: Flaggers and 646.85: Removal of Existing
Pavement Marking. Notice that these items frequently occur on a contract and are more frequently
renegotiated during the sample period.
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2.3.4 Estimation results for project costs and markups
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated relative project cost distributions for projects with
and without renegotiations.16 The densities presented in the ﬁgures are obtained
using the project pseudo costs divided by their corresponding engineering cost esti-
mates to control for diﬀerent project values. The solid red line indicates the project
cost estimates for renegotiated projects while the dotted blue line is the project
cost estimates for projects that were not renegotiated. Notice that the two panels
are distinguished by the comparison group employed to estimate c0. The left panel
presents the estimated cost densities of projects without renegotiations with the ex-
ception of new added item adjustments and dropped items (SA) and the right panel
presents the estimated cost densities of projects with no renegotiation at all (SB).
While the relative project cost estimates are not statistically diﬀerent, the level of
the estimated costs for the projects with renegotiations is signiﬁcantly higher than
those without renegotiations. In the sample, costs are more or less increasing in
proportion to the unit quantity estimates and there are no statistically signiﬁcant
scale eﬀects or adaptation costs evident at the project level.
With our project-level cost estimates in hand, we now proceed to the analysis of
markups. Markups over production costs could be associated with the risk premium
for project uncertainty and rents obtained by strategic bidding adjustments consis-
tent with asymmetries in experience and level of eﬃciency. Bajari (2001) shows
that markups decrease as the number of bidders increases. Bajari and Ye (2003)
ﬁnd that estimated markups are consistently higher in the collusive models than
in the competitive model, showing that they are around 3 to 4% depending on the
precise level of competition. Recently, Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) report
that the median markup above the cost estimate is 8.5% for all bids and 18% for
winning bids when considering adaptation costs. However, without accounting for
16These ﬁgures are obtained by using subsets SA (left panel) and SB (right panel).
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Figure 2.2: Relative cost in projects with and without renegotiation
contract renegotiations, the estimated markup drops to 3.7% for all bids and 12.52%
for winning bids. The comparison across results of the previous literature aﬃrms
that renegotiation is critical for the correct determination of markups.
In Table 2.6, we summarize our estimates of bidders’ markups over estimated
costs for projects with and without positive quantity renegotiations after controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity.17 We report results between 0.2 and 0.8 quantiles of
the distributions to avoid interpreting results from potentially biased estimates at
the tails. We ﬁnd that bidders achieve higher markups in projects when renegotia-
tion is anticipated. Furthermore, the estimated median markups are similar to those
reported in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). The estimated median markups
are 8.70% under ex post renegotiation, and they are systematically higher than
those in contracts with no renegotiation. The estimated markups for the projects
without renegotiation are slightly higher than those reported in Bajari, Houghton,
and Tadelis (2014). A possible reason could be that the road construction market
17Krasnokutskaya (2011) points out that the estimated average markups could be considerably
higher when failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 2.6: Markups for projects with and without renegotiation
Percentile
Group 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
With Renegotiation (SR) 2.532 4.072 7.476 8.695 12.300 15.090 17.400
Without Renegotiation (SA) 2.594 3.362 4.070 5.750 7.956 9.174 13.440
Without Renegotiation (SB) 1.702 2.310 3.562 4.610 7.072 9.194 11.760
is highly concentrated in the state of Vermont with the top two ﬁrms winning 1/3
of total projects during the sample period. In addition, our estimated eﬀects are
distinguished from potential price adjustments, which are confounded in prior esti-
mates in the literature. Table 2.6 suggests a diﬀerence of 3-4% at the median level
between markups in contracts with and without renegotiation.
2.3.5 Estimation of itemized costs
It is well known in the empirical auction literature there is no analytical solution
for the bidding strategies in an IPV setting with asymmetric bidders. It is also
known and immediately apparent in Table 2.5 that item heterogeneity is a crucial
determinant of whether an item is renegotiated. An empirical identiﬁcation strategy
that fails to address it cannot oﬀer credible evidence on the eﬀect of renegotiation
on bidding patterns and costs. Under the assumption that the share of an item
in a project’s bid is proportional to the share of an item in a project’s cost, this
section shows that it is possible to uncover itemized costs while addressing item
heterogeneity.
We begin by rewriting equation (2.5) for projects with kt = 0 8t as,
ci0  qe0 = bi0  qe0  
0@X
j 6=i
h0;j(s
i
0)
(1 H0;j(si0))
1A 1 : (2.11)
For simplicity of notation, we assume that the ﬁrst m items are renegotiated in
projects with change orders and these m tasks are also part of projects that are
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not renegotiated. Therefore, we can rewrite equation (2.11) for projects with no
renegotiated items by separating items into two groups, t = 1; :::m and t = m +
1; :::T ,
TX
t=m+1
(bi0;t   ci0;t)qe0;t =
mX
t=1
ci0;tq
e
0;t  
mX
t=1
bi0;tq
e
0;t +
0@X
j 6=i
h0;j(s
i
0)
(1 H0;j(si0))
1A 1 ; (2.12)
where the left hand side of equation (2.12) denotes tasks that are not renegotiated
in other projects that can include renegotiated items. Moreover, equation (2.6) is
equivalent to,
"
mX
t=1
(bi1;t   ci1;t)~qa1;t +
TX
t=m+1
(bi1;t   ci1;t)qe1;t
#
=

ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet
qet
0@X
j 6=i
h1;j(s
i)
(1 H1;j(si))
1A 1 :
(2.13)
By deﬁnition, because we use items that are not renegotiated in projects with rene-
gotiation, we have that,
TX
t=m+1
(bi0;t   ci0;t)qe0;t =
TX
t=m+1
(bi1;t   ci1;t)qe1;t; (2.14)
suggesting that we can substitute equation (2.12) in the second term on the left
hand side of equation (2.13). After some algebra, it is possible to evaluate the total
cost distribution for the group of renegotiated items as follows,
mX
t=1
ci1;t~q
a
1;t =
mX
t=1
bi1;t~q
a
1;t +
240@X
j 6=i
h0;j(s
i
0)
(1 H0;j(si0))
1A 1   mX
t=1
bi0;tq
e
0;t +
mX
t=1
ci0;tq
e
0;t
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 
24 ktqa1;t + (1  kt)qe1;t
qe1;t
!0@X
j 6=i
h1;j(s
i
1)
(1 H1;j(si1))
1A 135 : (2.15)
To uncover the cost of renegotiated items, (c1;1; : : : ; c1;m), we ﬁrst estimate the
left hand side of equation (2.11) and then we use these estimates to obtain the left
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hand side of equation (2.15). Using the procedure introduced in Section 2.2, we can
similarly obtain h^0;j, h^1;j, H^0;j, H^1;j, k^t, and q^at . In order to estimate (c0;1; : : : ; c0;m),
we ﬁrst obtain c^0 from equation (2.11) and then obtain, c^i0;t = bi0;tqe0;tc^0=si0 for
t = 1; : : : ;m. Thus, each itemized cost in the subset IA or IB is constructed as a
proportion of total project cost estimates. Those items experienced no renegotia-
tions in these groups while they were renegotiated in contracts included in IR.
We present results for estimating the itemized cost distribution in Figure 2.3.
The left panel oﬀers results using the set of items in the subsample IA and the panel
on the right oﬀers results using the set of items in the subsample IB. We showed in
Table 2.5 that the itemized bid prices are much more similar than the itemized bid
amounts, which is explained in part by observed diﬀerences in terms of quantities
across items. Therefore, it is important to focus the analysis on comparing directly
itemized unit costs instead of itemized costs. Recall that we restrict attention to
projects in which, at most, one item is renegotiated with positive quantity adjust-
ment. Therefore, it is possible to solve for ci1;t after we estimate equation (2.15) for
each item t 2 IR. These pseudo costs are used to estimate the distribution of the
itemized unit cost for renegotiated items. Figure 2.3 shows that there are signiﬁcant
cost diﬀerences between a set of items when they are renegotiated and when they
are not renegotiated.18 Increased itemized unit costs might be a result of a number
of factors, including workﬂow disruptions, additional work, dispute resolution, and
the necessity of overtime pay associated with completing the task. Additionally,
contractors carrying out projects in Vermont frequently have noted that when item
quantities are increased in mid-project, this leads to increased costs for those items
because suppliers charge for expedited or special shipping, and smaller shipments
receive smaller quantity discounts. The ﬁgures also reveal that the empirical ﬁnd-
ing is robust, because the distributions of cost estimates for renegotiated items are
18These ﬁgures are obtained by using subsets IA (left panel) and IB (right panel). Unit costs
are expressed in dollars.
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Figure 2.3: Itemized Unit Cost distribution for items with and without renegotiation
similar and are not sensitive to employing either subsample IA or IB.
It is important to note that we obtain diﬀerent itemized cost estimates for
projects with renegotiations depending on the alternative subsamples of items. Us-
ing a selected group of items that were renegotiated in some contracts and not in
others during the period of analysis, we are able to oﬀer a reliable comparison of
latent costs. The cost estimates should not be aﬀected by potential biases arising
from latent item heterogeneity because we use item-speciﬁc cost estimates from the
subsets IA and IB to estimate the itemized cost of items that were renegotiated in
the period of analysis.
Table 2.7 shows bidders’ strategic bidding behavior on the same items across
cases when they are renegotiated and when they are not renegotiated. We infer
that bidders bid less aggressively when there is a prospect of renegotiation and we
examine this hypothesis by contrasting their bidding behavior when they bid on the
same items with and without renegotiations. The median markup for renegotiated
items is about 16-18% which is much higher than that at the project level. On the
other hand, the median markup for items that are not renegotiated is similar to that
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Table 2.7: Markups for items with and without renegotiation
Percentile
Group 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
With renegotiation (IR) 7.319 11.510 13.720 17.900 21.950 22.760 31.470
Without renegotiation (IA) 2.763 3.603 4.188 7.000 8.195 9.232 13.540
With renegotiation (IR) 4.138 10.760 11.920 16.300 17.600 19.900 28.440
Without renegotiation (IB) 1.751 2.530 4.156 4.986 7.302 10.023 12.430
Non-renegotiated item 1.309 1.492 3.828 3.906 6.167 7.073 14.144in renegotiated projects
Non-renegotiated item in 1.482 2.149 3.987 4.661 6.906 9.017 9.885non-renegotiated projects
at the project level. Therefore, bidders seem to exhibit a diﬀerent bidding behavior
depending on whether the item is renegotiated. It is important to note that this
result is not driven by the complexity or nature of these tasks, because we compare
markups on items when they are renegotiated (items in the subset IR) to markups
on the same items when they are not renegotiated (items in the subsets IA or IB).
Lastly, it is interesting to see signiﬁcant diﬀerences between markups on items with
and without positive quantity adjustments even though items that are renegotiated
have higher unit costs than other identical items.
Table 2.7 naturally suggests that markups of items that were not renegotiated
in renegotiated projects are expected to be lower than markups for these items in
projects with no ex post renegotiation. However, the magnitude of this skewed
bidding is unclear. We brieﬂy address this question using the lower block of Table
2.7. We are able to estimate the markups for items that are not renegotiated in
contracts that have renegotiated items.19 We compare them with markups for the
same set of items in contracts that have no renegotiated items. Our procedure for
obtaining these estimates is as follows. First we subtract the cost estimate of the
19After deﬁning the set of non-renegotiated items in contracts with renegotiations, we found
155 items in a new subset I 0A which is analogous to IA and 39 items in I 0B which is analogous to
IB . The reason why we ﬁnd diﬀerent numbers of non renegotiated items in the two new subsets is
because SA consists of almost twice as many projects as SB , as shown in Table 2.4. The bottom
part of Table 2.7 presents results based on the subset I 0B , which consists of items from projects
with no renegotiation or added/dropped items.
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renegotiated item from the entire project cost estimate. Then, we estimate the
pseudo costs for the other items in the same project by allocating the remainder of
the project cost estimate among the non renegotiated items in proportion to their
itemized bid amounts.
The results presented in the last rows of Table 2.7 imply that ex post renego-
tiation on an item could aﬀect the entire project and bidders’ bidding behaviors.
Markups for the items that are not renegotiated in projects with renegotiation are
much lower than the markups on items typically renegotiated, shown in ﬁrst rows
of Table 2.7, and they are slightly lower than the markups on the same items in-
cluded in projects without renegotiation. (The sole exception is the comparison of
markups at the upper tail). The pattern of strategically skewed bidding revealed
here is consistent with that postulated by Athey and Levin (2001), adjusting for
our diﬀerent model of expectations based upon historical probabilities.
2.3.6 Testing the cost distribution invariance
This section reports non-parametric tests for equality of cost distributions. We
employ the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test in Table 2.8). This statistic
is commonly used in the literature to test for diﬀerences between two distributions,
and we use it to evaluate the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in the cost distributions
of projects with and without renegotiations. Based on the results oﬀered in Table
2.8, we fail to reject the null of equality of project cost distributions. At the itemized
level, the results indicate that the diﬀerence in itemized cost distributions between
items with and without renegotiations is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
That evidence is consistent with Figure 2.3 which shows that the location of cost
distributions for those items are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Our ﬁnding lends support to
the hypothesis that renegotiation is associated with higher costs at the item level.
The items whose costs signiﬁcantly increase due to renegotiation represent a small
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Table 2.8: Tests for invariance of cost distributions to renegotiations
With Renegotiation Without Renegotiation Tests
Subset Estimated Costs Median Mean SD Median Mean SD (KS)
SA Relative Project Cost 0.907 0.942 0.256 0.927 0.936 0.259 0.955
IA Itemized Unit Cost ($) 44.964 54.188 44.596 21.668 35.119 34.336 0.013
SB Relative Project Cost 0.907 0.942 0.256 0.936 0.906 0.204 0.558
IB Itemized Unit Cost ($) 45.038 55.174 44.581 19.081 34.702 34.815 0.002
The last column of the table provides p-values corresponding to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.
proportion of the total project costs, explaining in part the seemingly conﬂicting
ﬁnding at the project and item levels.
2.3.7 Counterfactuals
In this section, we conduct a counterfactual exercise to estimate the cost diﬀer-
ences in contracts when the probability of renegotiation decreases. The average
historical probability of renegotiation for the six renegotiated items considered in
the previous section is 18.48% during the sample period. In our structural model,
we assume that the probability of renegotiation kt for those items decreases by 5
percentage points. We assume that there is a positive linear relationship between
itemized bid amounts and the probability of renegotiation, implying that bidders
use the information on historical probabilities of renegotiation for those items when
submitting their itemized bids. The assumption directly implies that an itemized
bid increases proportionally with the increase in its historical probability. Using
this assumption, we are able to adjust the observed itemized bids that would occur
when the probability of renegotiations changes in the counterfactuals.
Figure 2.4 reports the results of the exercise demonstrating how the cost dis-
tribution shifts when the probability of renegotiation changes marginally.20 The
solid red line indicates the estimated itemized cost using the empirical probability
of renegotiation, k^t. On the other hand, the dashed line presents the estimated item-
20These ﬁgures are obtained by using subsets IA (left) and IB (right). Unit costs are expressed
in dollars.
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Figure 2.4: Counterfactual estimations for itemized costs
Table 2.9: An Analysis of Estimated Costs
Renegotiation Counterfactual
Median Mean Median Median Mean MedianMarkup Markup
Itemized Costs using IA $797,500 $716,400 17.900% $727,600 $664,500 14.938%
Itemized Costs using IB $821,500 $736,500 16.300% $751,700 $684,500 12.403%
ized cost using the new probability. We incorporate the adjusted itemized bids to
estimate, from equation (2.15), the costs that would exist under this counterfactual
scenario. As expected, we ﬁnd that a slight decrease in probability of renegotiations
causes the cost distribution to shift to the left.
Lastly, we report the estimated costs and markups in the counterfactual exercise
(Table 2.9). We ﬁnd that a 5% decrease in probability of renegotiation would lower
itemized costs by 7.06% - 7.24% at the mean level, depending on the subsets IA and
IB. The change in costs due to the probability reduction ranges on average between
$51,900 - $52,000. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, as the probability of renegotiation de-
creases, contractors’ markups are systematically decreased through their strategic
reaction by 2.96 - 3.89%.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the auction and contracting literatures by providing em-
pirical evidence on how ex post renegotiation in procurement contracting aﬀects
outlays on road construction contracts. We present detailed evidence that ﬁrms
strategically alter their bids and markups when they anticipate contract renegoti-
ations down the road. The analysis uses the nonparametric structural approach
to estimate the distribution of latent costs after controlling for project and ﬁrm
heterogeneity. Furthermore we assume that ﬁrms utilize the historical probability
of renegotiating particular items rather than possessing perfect foresight of future
renegotiations.
A distinguishing feature of this paper is that by examining itemized costs and
markups, we are able to uncover the strategy by which the higher project-level mar-
gins are obtained. In particular, we estimate higher markups on items that have a
history of frequent renegotiation. We ﬁnd evidence of unbalanced or “skewed” item-
ized bidding that is based on a homogeneous subsample of projects. The increased
proﬁt margins obtained through strategic bidding are consistent with the view that
ﬁrms often have information about the requirements of a project that is superior to
that of the state engineer, and are able to exploit these advantages and their market
position in order to add to their own proﬁtability. Bid skewness could be limited by
a design that deﬁnes reimbursement amounts a priori, in a way that is independent
of ﬁrm bidding as in typical asphalt or fuel price adjustment clauses.
Our work complements the important recent contribution by Bajari, Houghton,
and Tadelis (2014) in that we estimate increases in project costs associated with con-
tract renegotiations. Our counterfactual exercise indicates that as the probability
of renegotiation changes both the estimated itemized costs and markups. Finally,
we concur with their policy recommendation that states might consider “experimen-
tation with more careful and costly design eﬀorts.” We would add that our results
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point to the possible beneﬁts of more intensive use of “design-build” type contract-
ing mechanisms, in which contractors participate directly at the planning stage. In
that way their design expertise and specialized knowledge might be turned more to
the buyer’s advantage, and less as an instrument to raise the seller’s proﬁt.
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Chapter 3
Renegotiation on Incomplete
Procurement Contracts
3.1 Introduction
Contract theory states that renegotiation is desirable for incomplete contracts and
occasionally unavoidable for contracts that face exogenous project uncertainty.1
However, contract renegotiations are often costly and it can be diﬃcult to reach
an eﬃcient agreement. Highway construction contracts are commonly exposed to
ex post cost adjustments through change orders, which are used to extend the du-
ration and scope of contracts. Ex post adjustments through change orders occur
for speciﬁc reasons and payments depend on the type of adjustments. Fuel price
adjustments are triggered based on a market price index and the reimbursement
is independent of the bid.2 Quantity adjustments could be associated with engi-
neering errors and adjustment amounts are determined by the bid the contractor
1Bajari and Tadelis (2006) claim that renegotiation could achieve ex post contract eﬃciency in
complex projects, which are deﬁned as projects in which very high costs are necessary to provide
complete contingencies.
2Fuel price adjustment amount generally depends upon the magnitude of deviation of the
average fuel price from the index price during the project construction period and the quantities
of the contract pay items subject to the price adjustment clause.
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submitted at the auction stage. In contrast, an extra work adjustment is associated
with incomplete contracts due to project uncertainty of unexpected fundamental
change in scope. The price of the compensation for this extra work is determined
by a new agreement between two parties.3 This unique compensation process could
cause signiﬁcant adaptation costs at the renegotiation stage.
Starting with a seminal paper by Grossman and Hart (1986), there is a rich
theoretical literature on incomplete contracts. This literature considers contracts
to be often incomplete because of bounded rationality and contractual transaction
costs of writing an ex ante complete contract which describes a set of every possible
contingency.4 Hart and Moore (1988) show that the possibility of ex post renegotia-
tion on ex ante incomplete contracts will not lead to the socially optimal investment
level. Segal (1999) explores how the uncertainty or complexity of the ex post envi-
ronment could cause the contract to be incomplete. There is also a wide body of
empirical literature focusing on the determinants of contractual form as aﬀected by
contractual completeness (see Leﬄer, Rucker, and Mann (2008), Bajari, McMillan,
and Tadelis (2009) and Chong, Staropoli, and Yvrande-Billon (2009)). These pa-
pers show that contractual incompleteness resulting from project complexity often
aﬀects the choice of optimal award mechanism. Recently, Bajari, Houghton, and
Tadelis (2014) ﬁnd that contractors increase procurement costs by skewing their
bids on incomplete contracts.5
3The Standard Speciﬁcations for Construction book (Division 100, 1-9) in the Vermont Agency
of Transportation deﬁnes the extra work as follows: “An item of work not provided for in the
Contract as awarded but determined by the Engineer to be essential to the satisfactory completion
of the Contract. Extra Work shall be performed at agreed upon prices or on a force account basis
as provided in the Contract.”
4Literature has considered that the ex ante indescribability leads to contractual incompleteness.
In contrast, Maskin and Tirole (1999) argue that indescribability does not matter to achieve same
expected payoﬀs as with fully contingent contract as long as there are risk averse agents who are
able to probabilistically forecast their future payoﬀs. Hart and Moore (1999) argue that, even
if contingencies can be perfectly described ex ante, the parties are unable to achieve ﬁrst-best
outcome in the real world because of lack of commitment not to renegotiate.
5Athey and Levin (2001) also analyze bid skewing in timber auctions and show that contractors
are able to increase their expected proﬁts by strategically skewing bidding in anticipation of ex
post quantity changes.
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In this paper, we examine direct eﬀects of contractual incompleteness through
contracts that require upon completion extra originally unspeciﬁed work. We esti-
mate the distributions of latent costs and bidder markups using a structural analysis
by employing a homogeneous set of contracts. Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014)
show that ex post renegotiations induce not only adaptation costs but also large sur-
pluses to contractors due to their strategic bidding behaviors.6 We conﬁrm that this
cost increase is consistent and robust, even when we focus on only the contracts with
extra work adjustments. There is a signiﬁcant cost diﬀerence between projects that
are renegotiated for extra work and projects that are not renegotiated. However,
we ﬁnd that renegotiations for unforseen components have no eﬀects on bidder’s
proﬁt margin, even when using detailed cost controls in our bid function estima-
tions. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence that bidders strategically manipulate their
bids in projects with ex post extra work adjustment, while Chapter 3 present strong
evidence that ﬁrms strategically alter their bids and markups when they anticipate
positive quantity adjustments in road construction industry.7 Our diﬀerences can
be attributed to the lack of asymmetric information in extra work. More informed
bidders have strong incentives to strategically manipulate their bids to increase
markups. However, in the case of projects with extra work, bidders typically have
symmetric information regarding unforseen work.
This study is complementary to Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), while
we diﬀer from the prior research in two ways. First, we examine the impact of
6It is commonly known that renegotiations are necessary to mitigate ineﬃciency caused by the
incomplete contracts while each party (more likely a contractor in procurement auction) uses the
ex post renegotiation to seek rents. Once contracts are awarded, the procurer would be locked in
to the contract with little bargaining power. When the procurer is faced with hold-up problem (i.e.
lower bargaining power) the contractor would utilize the renegotiations as the form of opportunism
causing ineﬃciency. See Schmitz (2001) for a literature survey.
7Williamson (1976) points out that opportunistic renegotiation can happen at three diﬀerent
stages of the following; at the awarding of contracts, at the execution of contracts and at the
reattribution of contracts. There is a vast empirical literature that investigates the opportunism
at the bidding stage in public procurement. See, for instance, Guasch, Laﬀont, and Straub (2008)
and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014).
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extra work, that can not be fully accounted for in the original contract, on bidder’s
behaviors and contract costs. In contrast, Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) ex-
amines the eﬀect of any type of ex post adjustments on the behavior of ﬁrms or the
procurement costs. Hence, it is diﬃcult to isolate the inﬂuence of incomplete con-
tracts from simultaneous eﬀects that result from multiple concurrent adjustments.
A second diﬀerence lies in the empirical analysis, relaxing the assumption that bid-
ders possess perfect foresight about ex post renegotiations which is employed in
the previous literature (e.g, Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) and Athey and
Levin (2001)). Instead our model assumes that bidders forecast the likelihood and
magnitude of extra work adjustments for each individual contract. In the empirical
analysis, we estimate these likelihoods with a probability model, and incorporate
the estimates into our structural analysis.
It is worth noting that unlike quantity adjustment, existing items on the origi-
nal contract are not renegotiated in an extra work adjustment, but completely new
items are added to the contract. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
bidders know that the procurer cannot renegotiate the price of an item in a con-
tract, except in the case of an item added to the contract after a project is awarded.
Hence, there is an incentive for contractors to act opportunistically in exploiting
additional surplus when formulating the compensation for extra work with the pro-
curers. There may be substantial extra costs for contracts due to ex post haggling
and litigation over the payment agreements. Contract theory also asserts that rene-
gotiation imposes various transaction costs, including adaptation costs. Therefore,
the contractual incompleteness adds not only direct costs for executing new work,
but also indirect costs associated with adaptation costs. Bajari, Houghton, and
Tadelis (2014) estimate the adaptation costs of 70 cents to almost $3 per $1 of
expected contract adjustment in the highway procurement industry in California.8
8Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) deﬁnes adaptation costs as “. . . any costs that are in-
curred above and beyond the direct production costs of the project.”
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This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
data. Section 3.3 presents the model and structural empirical analysis. Section 3.4
oﬀers concluding remarks.
3.2 Data and summary statistics
The data employed in this analysis contain information on road construction projects
procured by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) fromMay 2004 through
December 2009. These projects include asphalt projects, bridge projects, traﬃc sig-
nal projects, as well as miscellaneous projects such as parking lots and landscaping.
These auctions take place on a weekly basis in a sealed-bid format where the lowest
bidder is awarded the contract for the price he or she bids. In overall procure-
ment costs, VTrans spent around six billion dollars during our sample periods with
the mean value of one billion dollars on these contracts every year. Most projects
have an advertising period of 23 days with 16, 30, and 37 being typical variations.
For each project VTrans provides detailed information, including engineer cost es-
timates, the location of the project, estimates of the number of days to complete
the project and brief descriptions of the project. The engineer cost estimate pro-
vides overall cost projections and a list of components in the projet including brief
descriptions, estimated quantities and required materials for all items.
In Vermont, any ﬁrm could become a plan-holder by purchasing the plans for
a project, but only pre-qualiﬁed ﬁrms are able to bid on the project. The pre-
qualiﬁcation status determines the value of the projects and number of contracts a
ﬁrm can undertake at the same time. Construction ﬁrms in the state are required to
submit a certiﬁed ﬁnancial statement and are assigned to a certain level of qualiﬁ-
cation based on their available working capital and performance histories. After the
contract is awarded, the identity and the bids of all bidders are made publicly avail-
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Figure 3.1: Project with Extra Work Location and Average Number of Items added in
the Vermont Transportation Construction Industry
able. Therefore, we have information on the bids of all bidders and the identities of
the potential, actual bidders and the winner for each project.
We also employ a change orders dataset, which includes ex post changed quantity
and payment for each renegotiated item with a brief description of that change.
There are ﬁve categories of adjustments to modify original contracts: fuel price
adjustment, positive quantity adjustment, negative quantity adjustment, extra work
adjustment and dropped item adjustment. We have information on any type of ex
post payment paid by VTrans, including the extra work adjustments this study
focuses on. A change order written as an amendment to the contract is widely used
in a ﬁxed-price contract to adjust compensation for the ex post changes.9 Change
orders are recorded if the changes are signiﬁcant from the original contract in the
Vermont transportation industry. VTrans is required to record the change orders
only if the cost ex post is greater than or equal to 105% of the estimate values.
9Addenda is another type of contract amendment for changes to the plans and speciﬁcations.
The diﬀerence from change orders is that addenda are issued before opening bids, hence bidders
have suﬃcient time to incorporate the changes into their bid.
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Figure 3.2: Propensity to experience extra work adjustments
Hence, we have full information on the actual quantity used of each task, changes
in scope of the project and the ﬁnal price paid on a contract.
Figure 3.1 illustrates that unknown site conditions lead to drastic changes on the
contracts. The left panel shows the geographic distribution of the projects with extra
work adjustments. There is substantial regional variation in the number of projects
with the adjustment. The numbers of projects with extra work adjustments are
especially high near mountains, where engineers could face more project uncertainty
at the design stage. The more items are added to the original contract, the more
incomplete the contract. The right panel shows that more items on average were
added to projects with high elevation.
The possibility that the occurrence of extra work adjustments could be correlated
with uncertainty is also supported by the relationship between estimates of working
days or number of items of contracts and propensity of extra work adjustments.
In Figure 3.2, the probability that projects experience extra work adjustments is
approximately 84% when their estimates of the working days to complete contracts
are greater than around 1 year. Furthermore, the propensity is about 90% when
the number of project components is greater than 80 items in projects. The more
the number of tasks in contracts, the higher is the probability of the occurrence of
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number of Mean Standard Min MaxObservations Deviation
Relative Winning Bid 312 0.968 0.191 0.436 1.762
Final Payment/Engineer Cost Estimate 312 1.025 0.223 0.532 2.014
Adjustment Amount ($) 312 114,566 219,474 -116,848 1,492,298
Extra Work Amount ($) 312 105,713 271,635 0 2,688,537
Adjustment/Engineer Cost Estimate 312 0.057 0.091 -0.174 0.770
Extra Work/Engineer Cost Estimate 312 0.058 0.118 0.000 0.876
Number of Bidders 312 3.349 1.959 1 11
Number of Items 312 60.228 35.346 2 245
Calendar Days 312 262.455 200.505 14 1221
Average Number of Extra Work 312 3.978 5.926 0 46
extra work adjustments. Finally, the longer the expected duration of a project, the
more likely the contract experiences ex post extra work adjustments.10
Summary statistics for the ex post changes and the auction data during the
sample period are provided in Table 3.1. The relative winning bid (each winning
bid normalized by the project’s engineering cost estimate) shows that the bidders
bid aggressively, indicating that winning bids are 3.2 percent below the engineering
cost estimate. However, the relative ﬁnal payment which is each ﬁnal payment
(winning bid plus adjustment amount) normalized by the project’s engineer cost
estimate is 2.5 percent above the engineering cost estimate. In our sample, the
mean adjustment is $114,566 while the transfer of extra work in that adjustment
is on average $105,713, or about 5.7 percent and 5.8 percent of the engineer cost
estimate, respectively.11 These ﬁgures show that the signiﬁcant component of the
10Even though Figures 3.1 and 3.2 support that uncertainty plays a major role in the occur-
rence of extra work adjustments, we will provide stronger evidence with the empirical analysis in
subsection 3.3.3.
11Renegotiations in public procurement are frequent and their impacts on the economy are
signiﬁcant. Previous literature shows that ex post changes are substantial in any industry. Bordat,
McCullouch, and Sinha (2004) ﬁnd that cost overruns are almost 9% of total contract amounts and
12% of all contracts experience time delays using data from 1995 to 2002 in the Indiana highway
construction industry. Oudot (2006) documents that 56% of contracts are renegotiated, increasing
the price by an average of 4.6% in the French defense procurement industry. Guasch (2004) reports
that 54.4% of contracts in the transportation sector in Latin America during 1990s experienced
renegotiations.
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discrepancy between winning bids and ﬁnal payments can be attributed to extra
work in the projects. The average number of bidders is 3.349 per contract. This
implies that the Vermont road construction industry has lower competition level
relative to other states because Vermont is smaller state with fewer local construction
ﬁrms.12 On average, contractors are expected to take 262 working days to complete
their projects. The complexity of the project is deﬁned as the number of diﬀerent
unique pay items in the contract and on average projects consist of 60.228 items. On
average about 4 items are added to original contract ex post with high variations
across projects in our sample. This table shows noticeable heterogeneity across
projects and indicates that it is necessary to control for auction heterogeneity in the
empirical analysis presented in the next section.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide further details about summary statistics for the extra
work adjustments across years and project types. The size of projects awarded or
extra work amounts are constant over all periods, while there is noticeable hetero-
geneity in the value of projects awarded, as well as extra work adjustments across
project types: the mean value of extra work adjustments in highway projects is
$140,677 making up 6.43% of construction project value. The most dominant type
of projects in our sample is highway construction contracts.
12On average, the number of bidders per auction is 1.1 lower than that in California, see Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) for more detail.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of contracts by year of award
ECE ($) EWA ($) EWA/ECE
Year Number of Mean SD Mean SD Mean SDContracts
2004 17 2,754,339 4,384,505 298,982 531,681 0.169 0.284After May
2005 54 1,793,051 1,695,207 144,071 271,709 0.075 0.118
2006 59 1,496,737 1,586,579 69,829 151,229 0.047 0.088
2007 51 2,232,715 3,648,056 96,639 376,236 0.043 0.072
2008 53 1,722,999 1,872,332 116,135 264,957 0.065 0.113
2009 78 2,036,507 2,145,181 63,030 140,247 0.034 0.091
ECE refers to Engineer Cost Estimates and EWA refers to Extra Work Amount.
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of contracts by project type
ECE ($) EWA ($) EWA/ECE
Project Number of Mean SD Mean SD Mean SDType Contracts
Highway 164 2,473,540 3,043,610 140,678 346,265 0.064 0.137
Bridge 117 1,396,333 1,173,448 74,591 155,540 0.051 0.097
All other Projects 31 869,658 1,330,259 38,201 68,886 0.046 0.072
ECE refers to Engineer Cost Estimates and EWA refers to Extra Work Amount.
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Figure 3.3: Density distribution function of relative bids
Figure 3.3 presents the non-parametric kernel density plot of the relative bid
distributions of contracts with ex post extra work adjustment shown along with
contracts without the adjustment. The relative bid is measured as the ratio of
the bid to the engineering cost estimate.13 It illustrates that bidders place less
aggressive bids ex ante in projects with ex post extra work adjustments than they
do in projects with no adjustment. Note that the size of this adjustment implies
the degree of incompleteness in the initial contracts. This bidding pattern is more
pronounced at the upper tail of the distribution. This ﬁgure seems to suggest that
bidders incorporate ex post possible adaptation costs into their bids ex ante when
they anticipate changes in scope of work in projects. We will discuss this issue in
13Note that we obtain Gaussian kernel estimates on a random sample of relative bids by consid-
ering Silverman’s “rule of thumb” bandwidth selection. We consider only projects with extra work
adjustment or projects with no adjustment at all. Then, we have only 281 bids, in which 105 bids
are from projects with the adjustment and 176 bids are from projects without the adjustment.
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more detail next section.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
A structural approach is widely used in empirical auction literature by assuming that
the observed bids are the Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the theoretical model. In this
section, we present a simple bidding framework describing ﬁrm’s bidding behavior
in anticipation of ex post extra work adjustment. We assume that bidder’s bidding
strategy is strictly monotonic and diﬀerentiable. We derive equilibrium bidding
functions assuming that bidders have prior beliefs regarding the likelihood of the
adjustments. Then, we employ nonparametric estimation methods similar to the
ones in Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006), Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), and
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) to estimate the primitive costs using observed
bids.
3.3.1 Equilibrium bidding behavior
Vtrans procures projects using a competitive auction, which is the most common
method of procurement in the transportation construction industry. A project is
characterized by a list of T tasks indexed t = 1; : : : ; T . Engineers in the transporta-
tion department provide their original plans including the estimated quantity for
each task qet (in vector notation qe = [qe1; : : : ; qeT ]). Each bidder submits sealed unit
price bid for every task. bit denotes bidder i’s unit price bid on task t (in vector
notation bi = [bi1; : : : ; biT ]). Let si =
PT
t=1 b
i
tq
e
t = b
i  qe be a score which is the
vector product of unit prices and estimated quantities. In low price sealed bid auc-
tions, the bidder with the lowest si is awarded the contract.14 Then, the probability
14In Oklahoma if the bid is more than 7% above the engineering cost estimate it will be oﬃcially
rejected while VTrans has no formal threshold for rejecting bids. VTrans may reject an irregular
bid if some items have bids of zeros. However, these are extreme cases in the real world.
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that bidder i’s score, si, is greater than bidder j’s score, sj, is deﬁned as Hj(si) 
pr(bi  qe > bj  qe). Finally, Qj 6=i(1 Hj(si)) denotes the probability of bidder i’s
winning the auction with a score si. Payment to the winning bidder is based on
quantities used multiplied by winner’s bid prices (bi  qe) plus ex post extra work
adjustment amount of A. The adjustment amount includes the production costs of
performing the additional work and the margins that a contractor seeks on the extra
work adjustment. Note that the size of this adjustment implies the degree of incom-
pleteness in the initial contracts. We assume that bidders know that a contract is
incomplete with the probability of k.15 Note that we consider only the changes in
the scope of work, extra work adjustments, in this structural model although there
are other types of adjustments as mentioned in the previous section.
Firm i’s expected proﬁt is ((bi   ci)  qe) (1 k)+((bi   ci)  qe +A)k if it
wins the project and zero otherwise. We deﬁne bidder i’s expected proﬁt function
as follows:
i(bi; ci;k)
=
  
bi   ci  qe (1  k) +   bi   ci  qe +A k pr  bi  qe < bj  qe
=
  
bi   ci  qe (1  k) +   bi   ci  qe +A k "Y
j 6=i
(1 Hj(si))
#
;
(3.1)
The expected proﬁt function deﬁnes bidder i’s revenue as the bid amount plus
expected extra work adjustments ex ante in the contract. The ﬁrst order condition
15This is not a strong assumption. VTrans engineers and contract administration specialists
believe that ﬁrms are able to anticipate spot errors in plans using their stronger expertise skills
and knowledge about a job site that VTrans engineers do not have.
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(FOC) is equal to:
@i(bi; ci;k)
@bit
=
h
qet (1  k) + qetk
i "Y
j 6=i
(1 Hj(si))
#
    bi   ci  qe (1  k)
+
  
bi   ci  qe +A k "qet X
k 6=i
hk(s
i)
Y
j 6=i;k
(1 Hj(si))
#
= 0:
(3.2)
Note that
h
qet
P
k 6=i hk(s
i)Qj 6=i;k(1 Hj(si))i is equal to @si@bit  @[Qj 6=i(1 Hj(si))]@si .
Now we divide equation (3.2) by
Q
j 6=i(1 Hj(si)). Then we have
@i(bi; ci;k)
@bit
= qet  
  
bi   ci  qe+ (A k) qet X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
!
= 0:
(3.3)
After simplifying, we write the ﬁrst order condition as,
 
bi   ci  qe + (A k) =  X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
! 1
: (3.4)
Equation (3.4) expresses the FOC as a function of k that is the probability of
incomplete contract. On the other hand, if k = 0 , then equation (3.4) can be
written as follows:
(bi   ci)  qe =
 X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
! 1
: (3.5)
In subsection 3.3.5, we will uncover the latent project cost distributions with these
equilibrium bidding functions.
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3.3.2 Selected sample data
The identiﬁcation and estimation of equations (3.4) and (3.5) require a sample of
projects that are more homogeneous and ﬁt the Independent Private Values (IPV)
framework for the known components of the cost. We assume that under the IPV
environment with ex post extra work, where each bidder knows his own cost for every
task on the original contracts while he is uncertain about the unknown components
of extra work. We use the following adjustments to the sample to obtain a more
homogeneous subsample. First, we select projects with extra work adjustments only
or projects without any renegotiation and then restrict the sample to projects with
estimated costs of less than 5 million dollars. Second, we obtain a subset of project
with similar level of competitiveness by restricting the sample to projects with two
or three bidders.16
In our analysis, we deﬁne two subsets of projects denoted by ST and SC . Let
nea denote the number of items on the original contract in an auction a while we
deﬁne nma as the number of items actually used in the ﬁeld. The subset of interest is
ST = fa : nma > nea; a 2 ATg, where AT is a set that includes construction contracts
with extra work adjustments. The subset of projects that are not renegotiated is
deﬁned as SC = fa : nma = nea; a 2 ACg, where AC includes projects in which there
is no renegotiation at all. Notice that the size and number of tasks are much more
similar across projects in the subsample than those in Table 3.1.
16Later in this study, we will consider diﬀerent threshold values to check the robustness.
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3.3.3 Reduced form estimation
In this subsection, we empirically model the log of the ﬁrm’s bid as a linear function
of an extra work indicator, auction speciﬁc characteristics and a set of bidder speciﬁc
characteristics. Here only projects with extra work adjustments or projects with no
renegotiation at all are considered. The equation to be estimated is as follows:
ln(bia) = 0 + 1EXa + 
0Xi + 0Za + i + uia; (3.6)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of bid submitted by bidder i in
auction a and EXa is an indicator for whether auction a experiences extra work
renegotiations. Xi controls for bidder speciﬁc characteristics and Za controls for
auction level variables. The ﬁrm speciﬁc control variables include a ﬁrm’s distance
from the work site as well as its rival’s minimum distance from the work site, and a
dummy variable indicating if a ﬁrm is a top ﬁrm.17 The auction speciﬁc variables
include log of engineer’s cost estimate, log of expected calendar days to complete
a project, number of project items, number of bidders, and project type dummy.
These control variables are similar to the ones employed in Bajari, Houghton, and
Tadelis (2014). Our regression model also controls for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects that will
account for ﬁrms’ diﬀerent eﬃciency levels.
Table 3.5 presents our estimation results for bid function regressions. We report
cluster-robust standard errors where clustering is at the auction level. Column
(1) displays the results from estimating equation (3.6) with the full set of bidders
while column (2) presents the results with only our selected subsample with two
or three bidders. The variables related to size or duration of projects have the
expected impact as stated in previous literature on bidding behavior. Bidders bid
17We assign a top ﬁrm if its value of projects won is greater than 6 % of the value of contracts
awarded each year. By employing the threshold, we are able to assign a similar proportion of top
ﬁrms to that in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014).
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less aggressively in larger value and longer duration projects. The variable on the
number of bidders is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in column (1). As the
number of bidders rise in an auction, bids will be lower due to higher competition
at the awarding process. The variable is no longer statistically signiﬁcant in our
subsample because there is less variation on the number of bidders as we deﬁne the
subsample. The variable of top ﬁrm indicator is not statistically signiﬁcant. It is not
surprising that top ﬁrms have no superior information on unobserved components
when uncertainty is common to all ﬁrms. Lastly, the bidder and rivals’ distances to
the project work site are not statistically signiﬁcant in this bid regression.
One’s natural concern in this analysis is that when we deﬁne two subsets of
projects in subsection 3.3.2, it generates the possibility of a type of selection bias. If
it is true, there is a potentially diﬀerent bidding pattern between projects that have
ex post extra work adjustment and projects that do not have the renegotiation. We
overcome the possibility of a type of selection bias by employing our homogenized
subsample of projects. The binary variable of extra work adjustment is signiﬁcant
in the projects with the full set of bidders, while the indicator variable is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant when using our subsample with 2-3 bidders. This result suggests
that extra work adjustments are randomly assigned, conditional on observable co-
variates and that our identiﬁcation strategy of comparing across projects in the
subsample is not introducing additional selection bias.
Column (3) in Table 3.5 displays the results for the probability model estima-
tions. We estimate the probability of the occurrence of an extra work adjustment
conditional on variables which control for size and proxy for project uncertainty.
In this speciﬁcation, we control for a common set of basic project characteristics
including log of engineer’s cost estimate, log of expected calendar days to complete
a project, the number of project items, number of bidders and elevation of work site.
In particular, the log of expected calendar days and the number of project items
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Table 3.5: Regression Results for a Model of Bids
Project Bids Probit Model
Independent Variable Full Set of Bidders 2-3 Bidders Full Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Extra Work Indicator 0.088* 0.054
(0.047) (0.049)
Log of Engineer’s Estimate 0.901*** 0.966*** -0.016
(0.033) (0.041) (0.102)
Log of Calendar Days 0.107** 0.165*** 0.404***
(0.041) (0.053) (0.125)
Number of Items -0.091 -0.147 1.666***
(0.133) (0.137) (0.425)
Number of Bidders -0.037*** 0.060 -0.027
(0.013) (0.049) (0.045)
Elevation of Work Site 0.046*
(0.024)
Top Firm -0.013 -0.155
(0.070) (0.118)
Distance to the Project Location 0.035 0.081
(0.062) (0.067)
Rival’s Minimum Distance to -0.020 0.063
the Project Location (0.059) (0.062)
Asphalt Project 0.047 0.015
(0.077) (0.061)
Bridge Project 0.051 -0.046
(0.081) (0.118)
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes No
Observations 281 116 312
R2 0.970 0.988
LR 2 70.57
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% and
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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are typically used in empirical auction literature to proxy for the uncertainty of the
project. The ﬁtted probabilities for projects are used for probability estimates of
the adjustment, k^, in our structural analysis. We assume that any bidder within
the same auction has the same belief on ex post extra work adjustment.
The coeﬃcients on the proxy variables that represent project uncertainty are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that uncertainty is the critical de-
terminant of the likelihood of ex post extra work adjustments. Indeed, engineers
in the transportation department are likely to fail to provide complete designs or
plans for larger and more complex projects. As emphasized in Tadelis (2012), the
complex and incompletely speciﬁed projects are key reasons for ex post renegoti-
ation. The estimated probability of an extra work adjustment is, on average, 71
percent during the sample period. When we construct the probability of extra work
adjustment diﬀerently, by dividing the number of occurrences of such adjustments
by the number of projects, results do not change from the one we estimated from
the probability model regression.18
3.3.4 Structural estimation
In this section we employ a structural approach like Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis
(2014), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006) and De Silva, Dunne, Kosmopoulou, and
Lamarche (2012) to estimate the equilibrium bidding functions for projects with and
without extra work adjustment. We estimate the bid distribution nonparametrically
with directly controlling for auction heterogeneity from the observed bids in the ﬁrst
stage. Given a sample of pseudo costs, we estimate the density of bidders’ latent
costs in the second stage. We assume that bidders are asymmetric in the sense that
there is signiﬁcant diﬀerence in productivity and work experiences across ﬁrms in
18Note that in Table 3.5 the unit of observation is bid submitted by an individual bidder in the
bid regressions while the unit of observation is contract in this probability model, and we utilize
all projects in our sample dataset for the probability estimation.
69
the road construction industry.
Failure to control for many auction-speciﬁc cost shifters in a structural analysis
will cause estimates of costs to be biased because auction speciﬁc characteristics are
correlated with the occurrence of extra work adjustment. For example, estimated
costs will be under-estimated on small valued (or less complex) projects while they
will be over-estimated on large valued (or more complex) projects. Following the
methods used by Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), we directly control for
auction heterogeneity from observed bids in the ﬁrst step of the two-step process.
There are two types of projects, indexed by r: those that have ex post extra
work adjustment and those that have no renegotiation (r=1, 0 respectively). We
ﬁrst estimate a model of the level of bids with the similar speciﬁcation to that
presented in column (2) of Table 3.5.
s
(a)
rj  b(a)rj  qe(a) = 0x(a)rj + 0z(a) + "(a)rj (3.7)
where the dependent variable s(a)rj is a project bid amount by contractor j in auction
a. The vector x 2 X  Rpx controls for ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects while the vector
z 2 Z  Rpz controls for auction speciﬁc eﬀects. The cumulative distribution
function of contractor j’s score is obtained as follows:
H
(a)
rj (s)  Pr(bjqe  sir) = Pr

0x(a)rj + 
0z(a) + "(a)rj  sir

 G

sir   0x(a)rj   0z(a)

Therefore, the distribution of residuals "(a)rj is used to derive the distribution of the
observed bids. We assume that "(a)rj are i.i.d in the bid function regression. The
ﬁtted residuals "^(a)rj from the regression in the ﬁrst stage can be used to estimate
bid density hrj() and distribution Hrj() for projects with and without the extra
work adjustment. We choose here a triweight kernel to estimate these density and
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distribution functions.
K(u) = (35=32)(1  u2)31fjuj  1g:
Furthermore, we employ the bandwidth of the form wr = ^(b"(a)rj )(nrLrj) 1=6, where
(b"(a)rj ) is the estimated standard deviation of b"(a)rj ,  = 2:9878 1:06, and Lrj is the
number of auctions in which a bidder j participated.
Given the estimates h^rj(si) and H^rj(si) we are able to estimate pseudo-values of
project costs in the sample of ci0 and ci1 by solving the following two equations.
(bi0   ci0)  qe =
 X
j 6=i
h^0j(s
i)
(1  H^0j(si))
! 1
(3.8)
 
bi1   ci1
  qe =  X
j 6=i
h^1j(s
i)
(1  H^1j(si))
! 1
 

A k^

(3.9)
These cost estimates are then used to construct the relative project cost distribu-
tions for projects with and without extra work adjustment in the next subsection.
Recall that k^ is the probability estimates for bidder’s belief on ex post extra work
adjustment we obtained from the previous subsection.
Next we direct our attention to nonparametrically estimating the distribution
over private costs. Figure 3.4 shows the estimated relative project cost distributions
for projects with and without extra work adjustment. The densities are obtained
using the project pseudo costs divided by their corresponding engineering cost esti-
mates. This ﬁgure shows that there is a signiﬁcant cost diﬀerence between projects
when they are renegotiated for extra work and projects when they are not rene-
gotiated. Increased project costs might result from a number of factors, including
adaptation costs. The costs could be signiﬁcantly high when resolving conﬂict or
litigation from contract dispute when making the agreement for unit price payment
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Figure 3.4: Relative cost in projects with and without renegotiation
between two parties.19 The extra work also requires contractors to extend working
days and change their work schedule of ongoing projects or change future projects
they are undertaking.
In Table 3.6, we summarize our estimates of bidder markups for projects with
and without extra work adjustment. Markups could be associated with project
uncertainty, bidder’s strategic bidding behaviors, or contractor’s internal level of
eﬃciency. The estimation results show that, once we control for project hetero-
geneity, there is little diﬀerence in markups between projects with and without the
adjustment. We already showed that extra work adjustments increase project costs.
These ﬁndings imply that bidders inﬂate their bids based on their ex ante beliefs
on extra work adjustments to incorporate risk premiums for project uncertainty.
19Guccio, Pignataro, and Rizzo (2012) also ﬁnd that legal dispute as well as complexity of
projects is one of key determinants of adaptation costs in Italian public work.
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Table 3.6: Markups for projects with and without renegotiation
Percentile
Group 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
With Renegotiation (ST ) 4.232 4.690 5.662 8.570 12.020 27.900 61.240
Without Renegotiation (SC) 2.188 3.424 4.938 7.900 11.500 25.120 48.260
Table 3.7: Tests for invariance of cost distributions to renegotiations
With Renegotiation Without Renegotiation Tests
Median Mean SD Median Mean SD (KS)
Project Markups(%) 8.567 25.350 30.639 7.903 22.680 28.530 0.595
Relative Project Cost 1.045 1.000 0.568 0.906 0.826 0.334 0.026
The last column of the table provides p-values corresponding to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test.
However, this bidding behavior does not aﬀect proﬁt margins.
We provide non-parametric tests for equality of two project distributions in
Table 3.7. The column marked as (K-S) provides p-values corresponding to the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We use the statistic to evaluate location shifts between
two distributions in projects with and without extra work adjustment. The table
shows that we fail to reject the null of equality of project markup distributions while
the diﬀerence in relative project cost distributions is statistically signiﬁcant at the
5% signiﬁcance level.
3.3.5 Adaptation cost and time delays
Next, we calculate the adaptation costs using a similar way proposed by Guccio,
Pignataro, and Rizzo (2012). We deﬁne the adaptation cost as follows20:
AC
(a)
j =
FC
(a)
j  B(a)j
B
(a)
j
(3.10)
20Note that Guccio, Pignataro, and Rizzo (2012) employ only the winning bids instead of all
bids in a contract. Unlike their analysis, the adjustment amounts across bidders in the same
auction could be very similar in this analysis because we have used only the contracts with extra
work adjustment that might be independent of bidder’s bid skewing.
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where, FC(a)j is the ﬁnal costs paid by VTrans and B
(a)
j is bidder j’s bid for an
auction a. Table 3.8 summarizes the results of calculated adaptation costs in sub-
sample of projects. The adaptation costs are much lower than those reported in
the literature. For example, the estimated adaptation costs are on average equal to
about 10% of the winning bid in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). However,
the previous empirical work employs all of contracts with any types of adjustments,
unlike our speciﬁcations. The table still shows that adaptation costs are substantial
and range from 2.46% to almost 3.02% of bids in contracts with only extra work
adjustment.21 According to Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), the adaptation
costs may be costs due to legal disputes over ex post extra work and losses due to
disrupted workﬂows. Besides the adaptation costs discussed in the literature, an
extra work adjustment may be more costly than any other types of adjustments.
For instance, the contractor may spend additional costs on training, research and
learning in order to execute extra tasks. Furthermore, contractors would spend
even more money if they had little experience with additional tasks required by the
adjustment.
Ex post extra work adjustments also cause for time delays that have adverse
eﬀects on public. As projects take longer to complete, road commute times will be
increased because commuters need to ﬁnd detours or sit in traﬃc jams. Time de-
lays are calculated by the number of days of time overrun, which is the proportional
diﬀerence between the adjusted duration and the expected duration on the original
plan in projects. The table shows that time delay rates have averaged approximately
15% to 35% depending on the number of bidders in our sample. The percentage
of contracts with time delays is around 84% in projects with extra work adjust-
ment. This table implies that ex post extra work could not only induce monetary
21Serag, Oloufa, Malone, and Radwan (2010) show that scope of work changes is the signiﬁcant
type of adjustment when the percentage increase in project costs exceeds 5% in the Florida road
construction industry.
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Table 3.8: Adaptation costs and time delays of project with extra work adjustment
Adaptation Cost (%) Time Delays (%)
Observation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Auctions with 105 2.458 4.426 14.715 54.343Full Set of Bidders
Auctions with 41 3.019 3.591 35.244 83.1322-3 Bidders
adaptation costs, but also lead to signiﬁcant non-monetary eﬃciency loss.
3.3.6 Robustness checks
To check on the robustness of our main results, we estimate alternative speciﬁca-
tions. A potential concern when estimating the bidding function is the possibility
that the top ﬁrm variable is endogenous in the estimation model. For instance,
more experienced and larger ﬁrms are likely to participate in the auctions of very
complex projects due to their ﬁnancial strength or experience with similar works.
As a robustness check, we proceed to implement two stage least squares approach
to correct for the possible endogeneity of the top ﬁrm variable. In particular, we
use the ﬁrms’ assets and their costs of revenues to capture exogenous shift to top
ﬁrm.22 In Table 3.9, we present evidence that the cost and markup estimates with
our identiﬁcations are robust to this change in speciﬁcation. We have consistent re-
sults that there is little diﬀerence in markups while there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in costs between projects with and without extra work adjustment.
Another potential concern in the literature is the possibility of bidder’s endoge-
nous entry. It would require one to explicitly model the participation decision of
bidders.23 In this analysis, the possibility of ex post extra work adjustments might
22The regression is overidentiﬁed because there are two instruments and a single included en-
dogenous variable. We perform the tests of overidentifying restrictions and fail to reject the null
hypothesis that both instruments are exogenous.
23Table 3.10 shows that there is no systematic relationship between the winning bid and the
engineer cost estimate as the number of bidders varies. This implies that we might be able to
preclude the possibility of endogenous entry problem in this analysis as Decarolis (2013) does.
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Table 3.9: Robustness Checks: Tests for invariance of cost distributions to rene-
gotiations
With Renegotiation Without Renegotiation Tests
Median Mean SD Median Mean SD (KS)
(1) Project Markups(%) 8.384 27.850 32.409 8.980 22.930 29.014 0.529
Relative Project Cost 0.988 0.945 0.551 0.907 0.818 0.339 0.086
(2) Project Markups(%) 6.422 15.340 18.997 5.372 14.250 19.309 0.391
Relative Project Cost 1.079 1.146 0.489 0.944 0.928 0.258 0.023
(1): The ﬁrst robustness check, (2):The second robustness check
The last column of the table provides p-values corresponding to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test.
Table 3.10: Summary statistics by number of bidders
Engineer Cost Estimate ($) Winning Bid ($)
Number of bidders Number of contracts Mean SD Mean SD
1 40 2,692,485 2,540,769 2,729,287 2,471,700
2 77 1,953,004 1,732,838 1,887,547 1,643,908
3 86 2,010,502 2,717,439 1,840,979 2,502,389
4 46 1,078,295 947,005 1,059,312 872,181
5 24 2,683,985 4,847,995 2,424,487 4,325,751
6 16 1,644,321 1,590,080 1,452,842 1,538,733
7 7 1,056,112 640,015 848,921 585,047
8 7 1,591,904 1,688,410 1,425,900 1,627,084
9 5 742,913 479,255 555,194 392,797
10 1 432,224 - 246,470 -
11 3 665,930 97,492 487,662 127,787
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Figure 3.5: Robustness Checks: Relative cost in projects with and without renegotiation
aﬀect bidder’s entry decision in auctions with and without the adjustments. To ad-
dress this issue, we employ the expected number of bidders in place of actual number
of bidders in the ﬁrst stage regression. The expectation of the number bidders is
constructed using the past year information on bidding history for all plan-holders.
First,we calculate the probability of submitting bids conditional on being a plan-
holder. Consequently, the expected number of bidders is equal to summation of
these participation probabilities for all plan-holders in an auction at time t (see,
De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge, and Kosmopoulou (2008) for more details). We
continue to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in bidder’s costs and no apparent
diﬀerences in bidder’s markups in this alternative speciﬁcation.24 Notice that we
There are few theoretical models and empirical tests of endogenous entry in the literature (see,
for instance, Levin and Smith (1994) and Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011)). In particular, little
progress has been made of endogenous entry with asymmetric bidders in the literature.
24We also consider the possibility that the cost distributions depend on the number of bidders.
If exogenous variation of bidders holds, the cost distributions for n = N are invariant in a private
value model (see Lemma 1, Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006)). We tried diﬀerent levels of participa-
tion for this alternative speciﬁcation, e.g. n =2, 3, 4 or 5. The estimation results with these values
consistently show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the overall cost of procurement. Note that the estimated
markups are signiﬁcantly higher than the ones presented in Table 3.6. The market becomes less
competitive in this alternative speciﬁcation due to smaller number of bidders. Previous auction
literature ﬁnds that less bidders will generate a higher expected bid in independent private value
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omit the bid regression results in our alternative speciﬁcations because they yield
similar estimates. The results are consistent with previous ﬁndings and are available
upon request.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on auctions by providing an exam-
ination of how incomplete contracting in procurement aﬀects costs on road construc-
tion contracts. This analysis uses the structural model to estimate the distribution
of latent costs after controlling for project heterogeneity. Unlike previous literature,
we include bidder’s ex ante belief that particular projects will have ex post extra
work adjustments. Our empirical results highlight a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in costs
between projects with and without extra work adjustment. Increased project cost
could be a result of a number of factors, including adaptation costs from work ﬂow
disruptions and legal dispute resolution for unanticipated work. We also ﬁnd that
bidders inﬂate their bids to incorporate risk premiums in incomplete contracts.
Information dispersed among bidders about ex post renegotiations plays a role
in procurement auctions. Our estimates show that the markups are not statisti-
cally diﬀerent, indicating similar proﬁt margins between projects with and without
the adjustment. In particular, there is no evidence of bidders’ strategic bidding
behaviors in projects with unpredictable work, because the general uncertainty of
this work is symmetric information among auction participants. In contrast, we
ﬁnd in Chapter 3 that a few bidders extract more rents by strategic bidding in
contracts with positive quantity adjustments. This bidding behavior results from
asymmetric information among bidders on change in quantity caused by engineer’s
errors. The more experienced ﬁrms are likely to anticipate actual quantity used
environments. These results are omitted to save space but they are available upon request.
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in the ﬁeld. Then, they have a strong incentive to manipulate their bids with the
superior information.
Most procurement ﬁxed price-contracts are awarded through open competitive
auction mechanisms. Transportation agencies should be allowed more ﬂexibility
in selecting award mechanisms in a highly complex project if they anticipate the
possibility of costly renegotiation due to an incomplete contract. Even though
ﬁxed price contracts oﬀer strong ex ante incentives for cost minimization, they
introduce higher friction when ex post changes are needed (Bajari and Tadelis,
2001). When there is uncertainty or signiﬁcant complexity in a project, it is argued
that cost plus contracts may be preferred because of the ﬂexibility they oﬀer and
frequent monitoring that may make it less costly to accommodate ex post adaption.
Implementing incentive structures could help to reduce the overall procurement
costs in complex or uncertain projects.
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Chapter 4
Uncertainty and Contract
Renegotiation in Public
Procurement1
4.1 Introduction
In procurement contracts, ex post renegotiations are often implemented through
change orders. Change orders have clear beneﬁts because they implement engineer-
ing speciﬁcations that address circumstances or conditions that were unforeseen at
the time the project was planned and initiated. The costs associated with change
orders are of two varieties. The ﬁrst are direct costs associated with additional
materials and labor, which often amount to more than ten percent of total project
costs. The second are “adaptation” costs associated with renegotiating the contract.
Recent research by Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) estimate adaptation costs
as between seven and thirteen percent of winning bid amounts. The existence of
adaptation costs in particular makes it worthwhile to investigate whether it is possi-
1This chapter is based on a working paper coauthored with Georgia Kosmopoulou and Richard
Sicotte.
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ble to identify factors associated with the incidence and magnitude of change orders.
If it appears that change orders are likely given speciﬁc identiﬁable characteristics
of the competitive environment, the ﬁrms or the project types, it may be preferable
for the procuring agency to invest more time on initial designs in a targeted eﬀort
rather than to proceed with the project and deal with renegotiations ex post.
There are relatively few studies that consider factors associated with the fre-
quency of renegotiations (see Anastasopoulos, Labi, Bhargava, Bordat, and Man-
nering (2010), Bordat, McCullouch, and Sinha (2004), Hsieh, Lu, and Wu (2004),
Iossa, Spagnolo, and Vellez (2007), and Oudot (2006)). The studies, mostly from
the civil and construction engineering literatures, identify uncertainty and complex-
ity as critical determinants of renegotiation. In the economics literature, Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) note that if ﬁrms anticipate change orders they are
likely to incorporate a bid premium into their ﬁxed price bid in order to shield
contractors from adaptation costs associated with haggling and renegotiation. Our
paper integrates and extends the contributions from these two complementary liter-
atures. We investigate what factors are most closely associated with change orders,
employing a dataset of highway and bridge construction projects in Vermont. We
estimate models of the number of change orders, and the relative cost of change
orders. We hypothesize that contract renegotiations arise from uncertainty about
the true nature of the project, and that these uncertainties are correlated with cer-
tain observable project-level characteristics, such as the location, size and expected
duration of the project. We also hypothesize that some idiosyncratic project-level
characteristics that correlate with such uncertainty may not be observable by econo-
metricians or even the state engineers, but are in fact known to one or more of the
ﬁrms bidding on the project. For example, if the winning bid exceeds considerably
the state engineer’s estimate, part of this “bid premium” may reﬂect the anticipation
of adaptation costs associated with possible change orders. The incentive to include
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this premium exists because although ﬁrms will be compensated for any change in
labor and materials employed, they will have to bear the aforementioned adaptation
costs. We also test the hypothesis that the lower the winning bid is relative to the
second lowest bid, the more likely it is that the winning bidder actually misjudged
the true nature of the project and that the other bidder(s) correctly anticipated
higher adaptation costs, and therefore incorporated them into their bids. An alter-
native interpretation is that such variation among bids will lead the winning bidder
to more aggressively pursue and argue for change orders ex post. We expect that
the top ﬁrms in the market may often have superior information about a project and
the market, enabling them to better anticipate change orders and their rivals’ bids.
When ﬁrms have an informational advantage, then for a given number of change
orders, their winning bids will be closer to the second lowest bid than when other
ﬁrms win the bid. We test the hypothesis that projects won by top ﬁrms are more
likely to have change orders. This will happen because the most successful ﬁrms
are more likely to select diﬃcult projects - an endogeneity problem that we must
control for - and because such ﬁrms have more leverage convincing state employees
of the necessity of such changes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides a description of the data.
Section 4.3 presents empirical results and section 4.4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, we ﬁrst present the salient details of
our database on change orders. The data used in this paper contains information on
all 312 construction projects auctioned by the Vermont Agency of Transportation
(VTrans) between May 2004 and December 2009. Our dataset provides information
on projects’ scopes, dates, durations, and engineering cost estimates. We have full
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       Number of Projects & COs
Total
1
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - 5
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 9
9 - 10
CO
1
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - 5
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 9
CONTOUR
100 - 900
901 - 1750
1751 - 2600
2601 - 3450
3451 - 4350
Interstate Highway
          Change Orders Ratio
Ratio
-2.493 - -0.001
0.001 - 4.000
4.000 - 8.000
8.000 - 12.000
12.000 - 16.000
16.000 - 20.000
20.000 - 24.000
24.000 - 28.000
28.000 - 31.547
CONTOUR
100 - 900
901 - 1750
1751 - 2600
2601 - 3450
3451 - 4350
Interstate Highway
Figure 4.1: Project Locations and Change Orders in the Vermont Highway Construction
Industry
information on the change orders for each project, including the changed quantity
and unit-price for each renegotiated item within a contract, with a brief description
of reasons for that change. Regulation requires that change orders are ﬁled if the
changes of plans or speciﬁcations impose at least a 5% increase in costs. Renego-
tiations are often signiﬁcant. In our sample, 81% of contracts were renegotiated
resulting in an average cost increase of 6.22% over the winning bids. Over the
period of analysis VTrans spent an average of $105,200 on renegotiations per con-
tract. Most change orders include some renegotiation about the use of unanticipated
materials in the ﬁeld.
The maps in Figure 4.1 show the spatial distribution of contracts and their like-
lihood of renegotiation.2 There are blue and red marks displayed on the ﬁgure that
vary in size by the number of contracts procured and renegotiated. Red marks are
2When we count the number of change orders, we exclude those change orders that only include
price adjustments. These are triggered by changes in the prices of fuel and asphalt that are beyond
the discretion of either the ﬁrm or the Agency. By the same logic, the renegotiated amounts that
we calculate omit amounts stemming from price adjustment clauses.
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superimposed on the blue marks. A blue ring surrounding a red mark shows that
some contracts procured in this region have not been renegotiated. Red marks dom-
inate the picture as renegotiations seem to be widespread. The right panel shows
the percentage of contract value renegotiated. It becomes more evident in this ﬁgure
that the contracts renegotiated in higher proportion are those in remote/less popu-
lated areas or in mountainous terrain. There is a lower percentage of renegotiations
on the more frequently repaired interstate highways. This ﬁgure suggests that the
frequency of renegotiation is strictly tied to the level of uncertainty, which should
be lower for repeat projects and for easier terrain.
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Figure 4.2: Histograms of the Number of Change Orders and the Ratio of Change Order
Amounts to Winning Bids
Finally, Figure 4.2 presents histograms of the number of change orders, and
the ratio of the change orders’ costs to the winning bid. The histograms show
distributions that are heavily skewed. While the average number of change orders on
projects is 3.478, 10.58% of projects have more than seven change orders. Similarly,
on the average project the cost of change orders constitutes approximately ﬁve
percent of the winning bid amount, but on nearly twenty percent of projects change
orders costs exceed ten percent of the winning bid.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
We ﬁrst study the probability that one more change order is ﬁled in a project.
Our dependent variable is the number of change orders submitted (y) for a given
contractor (i) in auction (a). The estimation of a count model with the standard
Poisson regression model is speciﬁed as follows.3
yia = exp(wia +X
0
ia) + "ia
3The Zero-inﬂated models are useful alternatives proposed in the literature (See Cameron and
Trivedi (2005) and Hilbe (2011) for more details) when there is an excess of zeros generated by a
distinct process from the count values. This is not the case in our model. As shown by Figure 4.1
only 18.59% of projects have no renegotiation.
86
where "ia an additive idiosyncratic error term and Xia is exogenous, such that
E("iajXia) = 0. Our empirical model incorporates a common set of project char-
acteristics including project size measured by the engineering cost estimate, the
estimated duration of a project and the number of items needed to complete the
project. Both the estimated duration and the number of items are variables typi-
cally used in the literature as proxies for the degree of uncertainty in a project. We
anticipate a positive relationship between these uncertainty proxies and the num-
ber of change orders. We also use the number of bidders to measure the degree of
competition in the market.4 To control for systematic diﬀerences across types of
projects, we use three binary indicators (road construction, bridge construction and
miscellaneous projects). We have no priors about the expected number of bidders
or the type of project. We account for diﬀerential work site conditions by using
the elevation information of each project, which enters in quadratic form. We hy-
pothesize that higher elevation projects entail greater engineering complexity, and
therefore are more susceptible to change orders.
We include two variables based upon bidding behavior, as deﬁned in the previous
section. The ﬁrst is the deviation between the winning bid and the engineer’s cost
estimate and the second is the “money left on the table” by the winning bidder.
Both can be interpreted as indicators of disagreement between the winning bidder
and the engineers on the one hand, and between the bidders themselves on the
other. Positive deviations between the winning bidder and the engineer’s estimate
are consistent with the inclusion of a bid premium in the presence of uncertainty.
4Due to the concern of endogenous entry, we use the expected number of bidders instead of
the actual number of bidders in this analysis, considering whether the plan holders’ identities are
publicly announced prior to the letting. It is calculated using information over the past twelve
months for each bidder and plan-holder list. We construct the probability of submitting bids
conditional on being a plan-holder. For an auction at time t, the expected number of bidders
is the summation of the participation probabilities. Then, we multiply a dummy variable by
the expected number of bidders in order to identify auctions in which there are more than three
qualiﬁed plan-holders on the plan-holder list. The state releases information on plan-holders’
identities only when there are more than three qualiﬁed plan-holders.
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Insofar as MLT, whereas higher values might be the result of larger diﬀerences in
costs between the ﬁrst and second lowest bidding ﬁrms, they might also reﬂect
diﬀering ﬁrms’ expectations about the true nature of the project. We hypothesize
that these disagreements are more likely when projects are uncertain, and more
susceptible to change orders. Thus we hypothesize that the sign of the coeﬃcient
for these variables should be positive.
We include a binary explanatory variable for “top ﬁrm”, (wia), which may be
endogenous in the estimation model.5 Large experienced ﬁrms may be more likely
to submit change orders as their knowledge and experience could help their chances
of renegotiation with the state government. The likelihood of renegotiation, how-
ever, is higher in bigger, more uncertain projects. Larger contractors are more likely
to undertake uncertain projects due to their ﬁnances and experiences with similar
works. This could create endogeneity concerns in our empirical estimation leading
to inconsistent estimates. We address the potential endogeneity bias by using in-
strumental variables unlikely to impact directly the likelihood of renegotiation but
critical in the establishment of ﬁrm size. These instrumental variables are ﬁrms’
assets and their costs of revenues, which are disclosed each year prior to the renego-
tiation process. This is omitted in prior estimation results in the literature because
it is often proprietary. Lastly, in this analysis, we include two controls for changes
in the business environment - the unemployment rate and the log of real volume of
projects auctioned oﬀ in a month.
The results, presented in Table 4.2, are obtained using the generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator. The ﬁrst column is our baseline speciﬁcation of the
count of change orders, and the second is the same speciﬁcation with instrumental
5We assign a ﬁrm as top ﬁrm if its value of projects won is higher than 6 percent of the value
of contracts awarded each year. By employing the threshold, we are able to separate ﬁrms into
similar groups shown in Table 4.1 and assign a similar proportion of top ﬁrms to that in Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). A top ﬁrm designation in the model pertains to its ranking during
the year before the change order was placed.
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Table 4.2: Estimation results
Number of Change Orders
Independent Variable GMM GMM IV GMM GMM IV
Log of Expected Duration 0.368*** 0.374*** 0.368*** 0.386***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.115) (0.123)
Number of Items 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log of Engineer Cost Estimate 0.258*** 0.247*** 0.266*** 0.218***
(0.079) (0.083) (0.074) (0.075)
Elevation of Work Site 0.090** 0.098** 0.082* 0.101**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
Elevation of Work Site2 -0.003* -0.004* -0.003 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Winning Bid Deviation 0.669** 0.649** 0.840*** 0.824***
(0.276) (0.283) (0.278) (0.303)
MLT 1.992*** 2.028*** 1.831** 1.476
(0.561) (0.562) (0.884) (1.112)
MLT2 -1.513 -1.533 -1.008 -0.525
(1.083) (1.059) (1.200) (1.356)
Top Firm 0.149 0.396 0.141 0.657*
(0.146) (0.386) (0.177) (0.354)
Top Firm*MLT - - 1.832 2.544
- - (1.334) (1.664)
Top Firm*MLT2 - - -9.042*** -9.677**
- - (3.429) (4.185)
Firm Experience 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Expected Number of Bidders 0.047** 0.047** 0.052** 0.052**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Unemployment Rate 0.074** 0.084** 0.075** 0.103***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.036)
Log of Real Volume Projects -0.944*** -0.922*** -0.970*** -0.980***
(0.232) (0.241) (0.236) (0.266)
Asphalt Project -0.125 -0.109 -0.153 -0.166
(0.207) (0.221) (0.203) (0.238)
Bridge Project -0.302 -0.256 -0.315* -0.268
(0.184) (0.197) (0.182) (0.216)
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 269 269 269 269
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, denotes signiﬁcance at the
5% and * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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variables for “top ﬁrm”.6 Consistent with the civil and construction engineering
literatures, our estimations strongly support the hypothesis that the complexity of
a project is associated with a greater number of change orders. Our indicators of
complexity - the expected duration of the project, the number of items involved,
and the engineer’s cost estimate of the project - are all statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. We also compute marginal eﬀects of independent variables at their
mean.7 A project that takes 100 days longer to complete than the mean duration
of 158 days has 0.497 more change orders. A one hundred thousand dollar increase
in engineering cost estimate from the mean of $1.09 million is associated with a
change in the number of change orders of 0.058. There is evidence that the terrain
is an important predictor of change orders. As an example, when the work site
elevation is 530 ft, the predicted number of change orders is 2.407 while at 930 ft
the predicted value is 2.831.8
Our bidding variables are also statistically signiﬁcant. The more the winning bid
exceeds the engineer’s cost estimate, the higher is the expected number of change
orders. A 10% point increase in bid deviation is estimated to correspond to a 0.169
increase in the number of change orders. There is weak evidence that MLT has a
quadratic eﬀect. The coeﬃcients on the squared MLT term are nearly statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The slope of the estimated quadratic regression function
is steeper at low values of MLT than at higher values.9 These results are consistent
with the interpretation that greater disagreements between bidders, and between
the winning bidder and the state engineer, indicate greater uncertainty surrounding
6Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) provide conditional moment restrictions with binary
endogenous regressors for the GMM to estimate count data models for the number of visits to
doctors. See Greene (2009) for a review of count models with endogenous participation including
the zero-inﬂated count models.
7We omit the marginal eﬀects to save space but they are available upon request.
8Note that the average elevation of the work site is 730 ft.
9For example, considering MLT values around the mean level, a change in MLT by 1% is
associated with a larger change in the predicted number of change orders if the initial MLT is
7.12% than if it is 14.12%.
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the project, and therefore a greater likelihood of unanticipated circumstances arising
that lead to contract renegotiation.
There is no evidence in either of these speciﬁcations that more experienced ﬁrms
or top ﬁrms are more or less likely to pursue change orders.10 The results indicate
that projects with a greater number of expected bidders have more change orders.
Also, projects undertaken when the unemployment rate is higher are associated
with more change orders, and there tends to be fewer change orders on projects
that are let during months with a larger volume of other projects. If contractors
have alternative proﬁtable options, their opportunity costs of losing a chance at
bidding in other projects due to extending the length of ongoing projects will be
much higher during economic expansions. On the other hand, they may strategically
submit change orders and extend completion by including another item to seek rents
during subsequent periods of recessions.
We now estimate versions of the model including interactions between “top ﬁrm”
and the MLT variables. Recall that if top ﬁrms have superior information, projects
that they undertake will have more change orders for any given level of MLT (or,
equivalently, for a given level of change orders, the projects that top ﬁrms undertake
will have lower MLT). If this hypothesis is correct, the coeﬃcient on the interaction
between “top ﬁrm” and MLT will be positive. Columns three and four of Table
4.2 contain the results from speciﬁcations including the interaction terms. The Top
Firm-MLT interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant in either, although they
nearly are when Top Firm is instrumented. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients, how-
ever, is greater than the size of the coeﬃcients on MLT, which have diminished in
size and - in the case of the IV estimation - lost statistical signiﬁcance. The inter-
10Since we have more instruments than the number of endogenous variable the Hansen’s J test of
over identifying restrictions is performed. The test fails to reject the null that the overidentiﬁcation
restrictions are valid, giving us the conﬁdence that our instrument set is appropriate. We also tried
diﬀerent threshold values for top ﬁrm assignment, e.g. 2-10%, and are assured that our ﬁndings
are robust to the threshold value.
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action terms between Top Firm and the square of MLT are statistically signiﬁcant
in both speciﬁcations at the 5% level or better. Moreover, the IV estimation now
indicates that Top Firm are more likely to submit change orders, after controlling
for endogeneity bias. The estimated coeﬃcient of 0.657 is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. The model predicts that a project with characteristics at the mean
levels that is carried out by a top ﬁrm will have 1.726 more change orders than a
project with those same characteristics carried out by a fringe ﬁrm. Nearly all of
this increase is due to the top ﬁrm dummy; the estimated impact of the interac-
tion between top ﬁrm and MLT is very small. We interpret these results as weakly
supporting the hypotheses that top ﬁrm have superior information and bargaining
power leading to more change orders on projects that they undertake.
The imprecision of the estimated coeﬃcients on the Top Firm-MLT interaction
suggests the possibility that top ﬁrms do not always possess superior information.
We explore that possibility by examining the data in more detail. In Table 4.3,
we compare the MLT between top ﬁrms and fringe ﬁrms on projects, as diﬀeren-
tiated by the types of change orders that occur. We are particularly interested in
comparing the MLT on projects where top ﬁrms are the least likely to have an
informational advantage with the MLT on projects where they are most likely to
have an advantage. When there is uncertainty common to all, as in projects where
change orders consist only of new items added (shown in the second row of the
table), both fringe ﬁrms and top ﬁrms leave more money on the table. When the
change orders consist of other adjustments, such as quantity adjustments resulting
from engineering miscalculations that experienced ﬁrms may be able to anticipate,
top ﬁrms leave systematically lower amounts of money on the table. The ratios of
top ﬁrms’ MLT to fringe ﬁrms’ MLT range from 0.350 to 0.563 in such projects.
Thus, the evidence in Table 4.3 suggests that asymmetric information is especially
acute in projects that have change orders with quantity adjustments.
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Following this line of reasoning, we estimate our speciﬁcation with the interaction
terms in a subsample of projects that have quantity adjustments. These results are
displayed in Table 4.4. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms of Top Firm with
MLT and of Top Firm with the square of MLT become larger and more statistically
signiﬁcant, whereas the coeﬃcients on MLT are smaller and no longer statistically
signiﬁcant. Compared with the full sample, the coeﬃcient on Top Firm diminishes
and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms
become larger and increase in statistical signiﬁcance. We interpret these results as
evidence that top ﬁrms are able to make use of superior information when bidding
on certain projects. Namely, they are disproportionately capable of detecting the
likelihood of quantity adjustments and strategically adjust their bids accordingly.
Lastly, in Table 4.5 we present the ordinary least squares and IV regression
estimates with the dependent variable, the ratio of change order costs to the original
winning bid which is a measure of the costliness of change orders in a project. Here
we ﬁnd results that have some similarities but also some diﬀerences with the count
models. The expected duration of the project, the bidding measures (“winning bid
deviation” and “MLT”), the expected number of bidders, and the unemployment rate
are associated with increased costs due to change orders. For example, extending
the expected project duration by 100 days from its mean is associated with 1.9%
point rise, in the ratio of change order costs to the original winning bid.
However, there is no longer evidence that work site elevation, the engineer’s
cost estimate, or the “top ﬁrm” identiﬁer have any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Moreover, there is evidence that the number of items on a project has a slightly
negative relationship with the costliness of change orders on the project. Asphalt
projects are associated with more costly change orders. Moreover, as indicated by
the third through sixth columns, the evidence that top ﬁrms’ superior information is
associated with more costly change orders is very weak, and certainly much weaker
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Table 4.4: Estimation results
Number of Change Orders
Independent Variable Subsample
GMM GMM IV
Log of Expected Duration 0.337*** 0.349***
(0.115) (0.121)
Number of Items 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Log of Engineer Cost Estimate 0.069 0.030
(0.075) (0.072)
Elevation of Work Site 0.082** 0.083**
(0.037) (0.037)
Elevation of Work Site2 -0.003* -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Winning Bid Deviation 0.424* 0.453*
(0.249) (0.268)
MLT 0.988 0.316
(0.765) (0.993)
MLT2 0.138 0.926
(0.817) (1.020)
Top Firm 0.002 0.290
(0.152) (0.434)
Top Firm*MLT 2.860** 3.732**
(1.229) (1.509)
Top Firm*MLT2 -12.871*** -13.397***
(3.994) (3.978)
Firm Experience 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Expected Number of Bidders 0.007 0.007
(0.021) (0.021)
Unemployment Rate 0.057* 0.083**
(0.030) (0.033)
Log of Real Volume Projects -0.782*** -0.925***
(0.246) (0.259)
Asphalt Project 0.050 0.004
(0.224) (0.257)
Bridge Project -0.184 -0.221
(0.216) (0.250)
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 167 167
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, denotes
signiﬁcance at the 5% and * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%
level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4.5: Estimation results
The Ratio of Change Orders Cost to the Winning Bid
Independent Variable Full Sample Subsample
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Log of Expected Duration 0.030* 0.030* 0.030* 0.031* 0.033 0.033
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024)
Number of Items -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Engineer Cost Estimate 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Elevation of Work Site -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.007 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Elevation of Work Site2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Winning Bid Deviation 0.082** 0.082** 0.079** 0.064 0.066* 0.066*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037)
MLT 0.104* 0.103* 0.037 -0.027 -0.006 0.008
(0.054) (0.056) (0.062) (0.077) (0.096) (0.124)
MLT2 -0.102 -0.101 -0.029 0.021 0.094 0.078
(0.074) (0.075) (0.084) (0.090) (0.111) (0.134)
Top Firm 0.013 0.015 -0.001 -0.010 -0.012 -0.035
(0.014) (0.026) (0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.039)
Top Firm*MLT - - 0.155 0.209* 0.136 0.122
- - (0.105) (0.119) (0.151) (0.179)
Top Firm*MLT2 - - -0.106 0.332 -0.128 -0.118
- - (0.412) (0.370) (0.592) (0.585)
Firm Experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expected Number of Bidders 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004* 0.007** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment Rate 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log of Real Volume Projects -0.050 -0.049 -0.056* -0.060* -0.059 -0.062
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.052) (0.054)
Asphalt Project 0.030* 0.030* 0.028* 0.029* 0.011 0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026)
Bridge Project 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 -0.004 -0.005
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 269 269 269 269 167 167
R2 0.139 0.139 0.146 0.130 0.242 0.235
*** Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% and * denotes
signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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than the evidence that top ﬁrms’ information is leading to simply a greater number
of change orders. The R-squared on these regressions is quite low indicating that
the model is accounting for about 14% of the variation in the costliness of change
orders. The model performs a bit better in the subsample.
4.4 Conclusion
We ﬁnd that uncertainty plays a major role in the occurrence of renegotiations.
Uncertainty is associated with the complexity of a project and is measured by prox-
ies, the most robust of which is the expected length of a project. Bidding behavior
is also a powerful predictor of the likelihood of change orders and their relative
importance. The larger the “bid premium” of the winning bid over the engineer’s
estimate, and larger disagreements among the bidders themselves, are related with
a higher number of change orders and their greater cost relative to the total size of
the project.
Moreover, there is evidence that the top ﬁrms in Vermont possess superior in-
formation on the likelihood of certain kinds of change orders, and incorporate that
information into their bids. Given the level of industry concentration, it is impor-
tant to note that we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that top ﬁrms submit more
costly change orders. These ﬁndings may permit agencies to better anticipate the
likelihood of change orders, and perhaps mitigate their inﬂuence on project costs.
Our results also suggest further lines of inquiry for economic research, especially to
ﬂesh out the sources of deviations between ﬁrms’ bids.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Ex post renegotiation frequently takes place in road construction contracts and
there is often a signiﬁcant increase in overall cost of procurement. The incidence of
renegotiation aﬀects ﬁrms’ bidding strategies with negative eﬀects on the eﬃciency
of highway construction programs. This dissertation examines ex post renegotiation
issued in the procurement auctions. The ﬁndings in each essay provide policy makers
with suggestions that could increase the eﬃciency of budgetary planning.
The ﬁrst essay is devoted to analyzing the eﬀects of the renegotiation in Vermont
highway contracts by using a structural auction approach. We examine how ﬁrm’s
bidding behavior is aﬀected by its anticipation of ex post renegotiation. We develop
a model that allows ﬁrms to predict quantity adjustments based on their historical
probabilities and the necessity of renegotiation due to incomplete engineer’s project
plans. Our empirical analysis shows that the magnitude of estimated markups is
systematically higher for projects with positive quantity adjustments than those
without such renegotiations. At the itemized level, these eﬀects intensify markups
of the bid. In the same projects, bidders lower their markups on items that are not
renegotiated, creating a pattern of strategically skewed bids.
The second essay focuses on another type of renegotiations in which all partic-
98
ipants typically have symmetric information on the need for the adjustment. We
analyze the impact of renegotiation on ﬁrms’ costs and markups, by focusing on
contracts with unexpected tasks. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ costs are higher in projects
with extra work while their markups are not statistically diﬀerent with those in
projects without such renegotiation. Finally, we could not ﬁnd any evidence of bid-
ders’ strategic bidding behaviors that create their higher markups as often observed
in projects with quantity adjustments.
The last essay provides an empirical analysis that examines the factors that as-
sociate with contract renegotiation on all highway and bridge construction projects
undertaken in the state. This study suggests that project characteristics such as
size, duration and location are valuable indicators of ex post renegotiation. The
magnitude of disagreements among bidders could indicate the uncertainty about
the true dimensions of the projects, and the ﬁrms’ bidding behavior is also a use-
ful predictor of change orders. We ﬁnd weaker evidence that ﬁrms with superior
information tend to renegotiate more frequently.
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Appendix A
Regression Variables
Dependent Variable Descriptions and construction of the variable
Log of Bid The weighted sum of unit prices and quantities on
the original contract. The logarithm of bidding
amount of each bidder on the original contract is
used in the empirical analysis.
Log of Itemized Bid The logarithm of itemized bids of each bidder.
Number of Change Or-
ders
The number of change orders occurring in a project.
The Ratio of Change Or-
ders Cost to the Winning
Bid
It is the ratio of total change order amounts
with quantity adjustments divided by winner’s bid
amounts.
Independent Variable Auction speciﬁc characteristics
Price Adjustment Ex post total price adjustment amount in the project
(in millions of dollars). The price adjustment amount
is the reimbursed amount according to the price ad-
justment clauses for fuel and asphalt.
Positive Quantity Adjust-
ment
Ex post total positive quantity adjustment amount
in the project (in millions of dollars).
Negative Quantity Ad-
justment
Ex post total negative quantity adjustment amount
in the project (in millions of dollars).
Dropped Item Amount The total value of dropped items from the original
contract (in millions of dollars).
New Added Item Amount The total value of new added items in the project (in
millions of dollars).
Itemized Positive Quan-
tity Adjustment
The dollar amount of ex post positive quantity ad-
justment at item level (in $10,000).
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Itemized Negative Quan-
tity Adjustment
The dollar amount of ex post negative quantity ad-
justment at item level (in $10,000).
Itemized Dropped Item
Amount
The dollar amount of dropped item at item level (in
$10,000).
Log of Engineer’s Esti-
mate
The logarithm of engineering cost estimates on the
original contracts. In this analysis, we include the
engineer’s cost estimates at the auction level and
itemized level depending on the dependent variable
speciﬁcations
Log of Calendar Days The number of calendar days that are required to
complete the project. The logarithm of the number
of calendar days is used in the empirical analysis.
Number of Items The number of unique items on the original contract
(in 100 items).
Expected Number of Bid-
ders
It is calculated using the past 12 month informa-
tion for each bidder and plan-holder list. We con-
struct the probability of submitting bids conditional
on being a plan-holder. For an auction at time t,
the expected number of bidders is the summation of
the participation probabilities. Then, we multiply
dummy variable to the expected number of bidders
to identify an auction, in which the qualiﬁed plan-
holders are more than 3 on the plan-holder list. The
3 qualiﬁed plan-holders are the threshold to release
the information on plan-holders’ identities.
Elevation The height of a project work site (in 100 feet).
Asphalt Project The dummy variable that takes the value one if a
project is the asphalt paving project.
Bridge Project The dummy variable that takes the value one if a
project is the bridge project.
Bidder speciﬁc characteristics
Top Firm A ﬁrm is assigned as a top ﬁrm if its annual revenue
value is greater than 15% of the total value of all
ﬁrms’ revenues each year during the sample period.
Debt to Asset Ratio A ﬁrm’s debt to asset ratio is the ratio of a ﬁrm’s
long term debt divided by its total asset every year.
Local Market Power The total remaining value of a ﬁrm’s ongoing projects
in a county divided by the total remaining value of
all ﬁrms’ ongoing projects in that county at time t.
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Log of Firm’s Backlog We assume that a project is completed in a uni-
form fashion over the length of the contract. A con-
tract backlog is constructed by summing the remain-
ing values of a ﬁrm’s ongoing projects. However, if
projects are completed, the backlog of the ﬁrm goes
to zero. The logarithm of the amount of a bidder’s
current backlog is used in the empirical analysis.
Log of Rival’s Minimum
Backlog
The logarithm of the minimum of all rivals’ backlog
amounts in an auction.
Distance to the Project
Locations
The distance between the ﬁrm’s location and the lo-
cation of work sites (in 100 miles). If a project needs
to perform statewide, we consider its location as the
center of the state. Moreover, if a project has multi-
ple sub-projects, we take the average of the distances
to each work site.
Rival’s Minimum Dis-
tance
The minimum distance of all rivals’ distances be-
tween work sites and their locations in an auction
(in 100 miles).
Winning Bid Deviation The proportional diﬀerence between the winning bid
and the engineer cost estimates.
Money Left on the Table
(MLT)
It is the proportional diﬀerence between the winning
and the second lowest bid when there are multiple
bidders. In the case of a single bidder, it is con-
structed as the proportional diﬀerence between the
winning bidder and the engineering cost estimate.
Firm Experience Firm experience is ﬁrm’s number of years in business
in the market. We measure it by counting years form
establishment of the ﬁrm.
Variables on general economic conditions
Average Number of
Building Permits
This variable measures the three month moving aver-
age of the monthly number of building permits issued
in the state of Vermont. The data come from the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (in 10,000).
Unemployment Rate The monthly unemployment rate in Vermont ad-
justed for seasonal ﬂuctuations from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS).
Monthly Dummies There are in total 11 monthly dummies that control
for the months of the year. The omitted month is
December.
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Appendix B
Technical Appendix
We assume that there are 4 bidders such as i; j; k and l to show how we derived
equation (2.4). Equation (2.2) can be written as,
i(bi; ci;k)
=

bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)  ci  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe) (1 Hj(si))(1 Hk(si))(1 Hl(si)) :
Note that si = bi  qe. After we take a derivative of a bidder’s expected payoﬀ
function with respect to bidder i’s unit price, we get
@i(bi; ci;k)
@bit
= (ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet )

(1 Hj(si)) (1 Hk(si)) (1 Hl(si))

+

bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)
 ci  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe) qet  hj(si)(1 Hk(si))(1 Hl(si))  hk(si)(1 Hj(si))(1 Hl(si))
 hl(si)(1 Hj(si))(1 Hk(si))

= 0: (B.1)
This equation can be written as,
@i(bi; ci;k)
@bit
= (ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet )
24Y
j 6=i
(1 Hj(si)
35  bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)  ci  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)

24qet X
k 6=i
hk(s
i)
Y
j 6=i;k
(1 Hj(si))
35 = 0
Now we divide equation (B.1) above by

(1 Hj(si)) (1 Hk(si)) (1 Hl(si))

to
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obtain,
(ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet ) 

bi  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)  ci  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe)
24qet X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
35
= 0
Simplifying we get equation (2.4):
(bi   ci)  (k  qa + (1  k)  qe) =

ktq
a
t + (1  kt)qet
qet


0@X
j 6=i
hj(s
i)
(1 Hj(si))
1A 1 :
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